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Summary 
The work presented in this thesis uses structural priming to investigate pragmatic 
enrichment. Chapter 2 looks at the role the alternative plays in the derivation of scalar 
implicatures. We investigate whether the salience of the alternative is sufficient for the 
derivation of scalar implicatures or whether an additional usage mechanism is required. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the derivation of one particular category of implicature known as ad 
hoc implicatures. Ad hoc implicatures are different from traditional scalar implicatures in 
that they do not have a predefined scale from which to draw alternatives. We test whether 
specific alternatives are used in the derivation of ad hoc implicatures or whether a general 
anything else alternative is used. Chapter 4 investigates interlocutor alignment in the 
production of implicatures. Since implicature comprehension can be primed we extend 
this by investigating implicature production. The findings of the work presented here 
demonstrate that structural priming can be extended beyond its traditional application to 
syntax and semantics and can be used to provide insight into pragmatic enrichments. 
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Introduction 
The human communicative ability is impressive. Every day we engage in multiple 
conversations, interacting successfully with a number of people and more often than not 
we are able to engage in these communicative exchanges with very little difficulty. This is 
surprising since speakers are not always explicit. That is, speakers often convey more than 
is explicitly encoded in an utterance. Consequently, listeners are required to undertake 
additional processing in order to reach the speaker’s intended meaning.  
 How we make sense of the unsaid has been a topic of great interest to linguists, 
philosophers, and psychologists alike. The main tenet of this thesis is to examine 
pragmatic enrichment, specifically implicatures, using structural priming. I first present a 
discussion of pragmatics and implicatures before discussing structural priming. 
Pragmatics 
Communication between two interlocutors is often characterised in the following 
way: one person, the speaker, has an idea that they wish to communicate to their partner, 
the hearer. The speaker’s message is encoded into a linguistic signal that they then 
produce. The hearer receives this signal and decodes it to reach meaning (e.g. Levelt, 
1989). Arriving at the speaker’s intended meaning however, is not straightforward. What 
speakers intend to say often goes beyond the literal meaning of the words they utter. For 
example “Can you pass the salt?” is rarely used to assess the addressee’s ability to pass the 
salt, on asking this question the speaker is usually requesting the salt. In order for the 
addressee to reach the correct interpretation they must recognise the speaker’s 
communicative intent as being a request. 
Whilst some utterance meanings are straightforward and encoded in the literal 
meaning of the words used, many rely on extralinguistic information in order to be 
comprehended as the speaker intended. Many expressions are ambiguous and their 
meaning depends upon the context in which they are uttered.  For example when asking 
where someone is, the reply “By the bank” could have two different interpretations 
depending upon the speaker’s location. If they are in a city centre this is likely to be 
interpreted as meaning by a financial institution whereas, if they are in the countryside 
this interpretation is far less likely. Thus the context in which the reply was uttered could 
disambiguate the meaning. This information, however, is not structurally encoded in the 
utterance. 
Introduction 
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Similarly, comprehending non-literal language, such as metaphors and idioms, 
requires going beyond the linguistic input. For example, by saying “My computer is a 
dinosaur,” it is unlikely that the speaker means they have a dinosaur for a computer but 
that their computer is old. In saying “it’s raining cats and dogs” the speaker is conveying 
that it is raining heavily, not that there are cats and dogs falling from the sky. These 
interpretations do not form part of the explicitly coded content of the utterances and thus 
require individuals to go beyond the literal meaning (Gibbs, 1994; Glucksberg & McGlone, 
2001; Searle 1979; Grice, 1989). 
In order to make sense of most linguistic encounters we must look at factors outside 
of the linguistic content and instead look at how the language was used, the context in 
which it was uttered. The study of how language is used is known as pragmatics. One of 
the most influential figures in pragmatics was Grice. Grice emphasised the importance of 
inference in communication. In order for listeners to understand utterances more often 
than not they must infer what the speaker meant. That is, a listener must go beyond that 
which is explicitly encoded in the message to infer the speaker’s meaning. 
How listeners understand what a speaker intends when the speaker has not been 
explicit is rooted in what Grice called the Cooperative Principle (Grice, 1989). 
Conversation is an inherently cooperative activity where both speaker and listener work 
together to achieve a common goal of understanding. The cooperative principle outlines 
standards of rational interaction:  
"…make [your] conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" 
(Grice, 1989, pp.41).   
Grice proposed a more specific set of conversational maxims. The maxims expand 
upon the Cooperative Principle by characterizing acceptable conversational contributions: 
Quantity: (1) make your contribution as informative as is required, (2) do not make 
your contribution more informative than is required. 
Quality: (1) make your contributions true, (2) do not say what you believe to be false, 
(3) do not say that for which you lack evidence. 
Relation: be relevant. 
Manner: (1) be perspicuous, (2) avoid obscure expressions, (3) avoid ambiguity, (4) be 
orderly.  
  Introduction 
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Whilst these maxims may guide rational interaction, they are not necessarily 
adhered to. In everyday conversation speakers often appear to flout the maxims. Despite 
the apparent disregard for the conversational maxims listeners often interpret utterances 
as consistent with the maxims in order to preserve the assumption of cooperation. 
Deviation from the maxims can indicate to listeners that the speaker is using an 
implicature. As a result, the listener is required to make an inference. Consider the 
following examples: 
(1) A: Are John and Mary coming to the party?  
B: John is coming to the party. 
=> Mary is not. 
(2) A: How did Betty get on with her exams? 
B: She passed some of them. 
=> She passed some but not all of them. 
In (1), the explicit content of speaker B’s utterance only partially answers speaker 
A’s question since only John is referred to. Although B’s reply does not explicitly answer 
A’s query about both John and Mary, A is likely to conclude that John is coming and Mary is 
not. In order for A to reach this interpretation, she must make an inference. A asked about 
both John and Mary but B only answered explicitly about John’s attendance. Therefore B’s 
utterance is less informative than required and violates the maxim of Quantity (be as 
informative as is required). Assuming that B is a rational and cooperative speaker then he 
must have a reason for violating the maxim. For example, if B does not know whether 
Mary will attend then by saying nothing he is observing the maxim of Quality (do not say 
that which you do not have evidence for). In order for A to infer that Mary is not coming to 
the party she must assume that speaker B is in a position to know whether or not Mary is 
coming to the party, this is known as the epistemic step (Chierchia, Fox, & Spector, 2012; 
Sauerland, 2004). 
A standard approach to how this inference is derived is as follows: (i) the listener 
computes a basic (literal) meaning of an utterance, (ii) recognises that an alternative 
phrase could have been used, (iii) negates this alternative, (iv) combines the basic 
meaning with the negated alternative. Continuing with the example above, A recognises 
that B could have said “John and Mary are coming to the party” (the alternative). Since B 
did not say this, and assuming that he is in a position of knowledge and is being 
cooperative, A can infer that “John and Mary are coming to the party” is not true. Thus, 
combining what is said, John is coming to the party, with the negation of the alternative, 
Introduction 
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John and Mary are coming to the party, the listener arrives at the interpretation that John 
but not Mary is coming to the party. This is an example of a scalar implicature.  
Scalar implicatures 
This thesis is concerned with one particular type of Gricean implicature known as 
scalar implicatures. Scalar implicatures arise when a speaker has been less than maximally 
informative. This is usually triggered when a speaker uses a semantically weaker term 
from an entailment scale1 (Horn, 1972; Gazdar, 1979; Hirschberg, 1985; Matsumoto, 
1995). For example, in (1), John is coming to the party is semantically weaker than John 
and Mary are coming to the party. Scales can be contextual2, as in this case, or lexical. Take 
(2) for example. Speaker B uses some which is weaker than the alternative all. Following 
the same reasoning as for (1), since B did not say all, A can infer not all, which results in 
the inference that Betty passed some but not all of her exams. 
Implicatures have a number of distinctive properties which distinguish them from 
literal meaning. These are: calculability, cancellability, reinforceability, nondetachability, 
nonconventionality, and universality. The first of these, calculability, is the ability to 
construct an argument using the maxims to demonstrate how the implicated meaning 
arises. This can be seen in the descriptions above. The second, cancellability, refers to the 
ability to explicitly cancel the implicature. In (2) the implicature that arises is Betty passed 
some but not all of her exams. It is possible to cancel this in a subsequent clause by stating 
the stronger alternative: Betty passed some of her exams, in fact she passed them all. It is 
not possible to cancel entailments. Take (3): 
(3) Sarah has been to Paris. 
-> Sarah has been to France. 
The sentence Sarah has been to Paris entails that Sarah has been to France. 
Attempting to cancel the entailment results in a nonsensical sentence; Sarah has been to 
Paris, but she has not been to France. The cancellation of implicatures however, does not 
result in nonsensical sentences. Similarly it is possible to reinforce an implicature by 
explicitly adding the implicated content. Take example (2) again, explicitly stating the 
implicated content does not give a rise to the same sense of redundancy that repeating the 
coded content of an utterance does (Levinson, 2000). For example, to say that Betty 
                                                          
1 An entailment scale consists of terms which are ordered based on their semantic strength. 
Stronger terms on the scale entail weaker terms e.g. <some, all>, <or, and>, <warm, hot>, <cool, 
cold> . The terms on the right entail terms on the left. 
2 Some work suggests that ad hoc implicatures such as these are not necessarily derived in the 
same way as other prototypical implicatures in that they may not rely on a specified set of 
alternatives. I will return to this point in Chapter 3. 
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passed some of her exams, but not all of them does not give rise to the sense of 
redundancy that Sarah has been to Paris and she has been to France does. 
Implicatures are nondetachable from the explicit form used. This is because 
implicatures are a consequence of the semantic content rather than the linguistic form. 
Expressions that contain the same coded content will carry the same implicatures; 
changing the wording does not remove the implicature. The example from Grice is try 
(1989, p.43). Try implies that there was a failure or the risk of failure. The implicature that 
arises from tried to do x also arises with attempted to do x. Similarly the same sarcastic 
interpretation in response to a waitress dropping a plate arises in (4) and (5). 
(4) Oh good job! 
(5) Well done! 
This differs from presuppositions which are associated with specific words or 
phrases. Changing the word itself may affect the presupposition as seen in (6) and (7). The 
presence of too in (6) presupposes that there is someone else who likes jam sandwiches, 
removing too in (7) removes this presupposition. 
(6) Louise likes jam sandwiches too. 
=>There is someone else who likes jam sandwiches. 
(7) Louise likes jam sandwiches. 
Finally Universality, the cooperative principle and conversational maxims that make 
up Grice's rational theory of communication are fundamental assumptions which are 
required in order for successful communication. Consequently they should hold across 
cultures and thus be universal (Levinson, 2000). 
Research on scalar implicatures typically focuses on how a listener processes the 
implicature and whether or not there is a cost to deriving an implicature (e.g. Bott & 
Noveck, 2004; Bott, Bailey, & Grodner, 2012; Breheny, Ferguson, & Katsos, 2013; Breheny, 
Katsos, & Williams, 2006; Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015; Grodner, Klein, Carbary, & 
Tanenhaus, 2010; Huang & Snedeker, 2009; Noveck & Posada, 2003; Tomlinson, Bailey, & 
Bott, 2014). This thesis takes a different approach and focuses on the priming of 
implicatures. 
Priming 
The production and comprehension of language does not occur in isolation. Our 
previous linguistic encounters can influence how a sentence is understood or a speaker’s 
choice of utterance. People are often repetitive in their language use; commonly during a 
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conversation interlocutors will repeat phrases or entire sentence structures they have 
previously encountered in the interaction. For example Levelt and Kelter (1982) found 
that people were more likely to include the preposition at in their reply when asked “At 
what time does your shop close?” than if they were asked “What time does your shop 
close?” This phenomenon is known as priming. 
In a seminal study Bock (1986) investigated structural priming under the guise of a 
memory task. Participants were presented with a sentence that they had to repeat (prime) 
and then they had to describe a picture (target). The form of the prime sentence was 
varied; sentences were either active or passive (e.g., “One of the fans punched the referee”, 
or “The referee was punched by one of the fans”) or used double object or prepositional 
object structures (e.g. “The man is reading the boy a book”, or “The man is reading a book 
to the boy”). Participants then had to describe a target picture which could be described 
using either form (active or passive and double or prepositional object). Bock found that 
the form of the sentence reliably affected the form of the target description. Active 
descriptions were more likely after active primes and less likely after passive primes. 
Similarly, double object constructions were more likely following double object than 
prepositional object primes. Since Bock’s initial study researchers have used priming to 
investigate a wide range of linguistic phenomenon. 
Priming effects are found throughout the language system: in written and spoken 
production (e.g. Branigan, Pickering, & Cleland, 1999; 2000; Branigan, Pickering, McLean 
& Cleland, 2007; Brennan & Clark, 1996; Pickering & Branigan, 1998), comprehension (e.g. 
Arai, van Gompel, Scheepers, 2007; Branigan, Pickering, & McLean, 2005; Myslin & Levy, 
2016; Scheepers & Crocker, 2004; Sturt, Keller, & Dubey, 2010; Thothathiri & Snedeker, 
2008; Tooley & Traxler, 2010) and across languages (e.g. Flett, Branigan, & Pickering, 
2012; Hartsuiker, Beerts, Loncke, Desmet, & Bernolet, 2016; Hartsuiker & Westenberg, 
2000; Lobell & Bock, 2003; Scheepers, 2003). The results of priming studies have proved 
informative about the organisation and working of the language system (Branigan & 
Pickering, 2017; Pickering & Ferriera, 2008).  
Priming effects are usually explained in terms of the activation of representations. 
When a stimulus is first encountered the representations that are associated with it 
become activated. These representations retain some activation across time. When a 
subsequent stimulus is encountered, if it is shares some features with the previous stimuli 
then it will activate similar representations.  Since those representations would have 
residual activation from being used recently they reach the activation threshold faster. If 
the processing of one stimulus affects the processing of a subsequent stimulus then these 
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two stimuli must share some dimension of representation within the language processor. 
Priming can only occur if the language processor is sensitive to the dimension along which 
the two stimuli are related. 
Typically, priming studies have focused on syntax and semantics (Branigan & 
Pickering, 2017) however, aspects of pragmatics, such as scalar implicatures, can also be 
investigated using priming (Bott & Chemla, 2016; Rees & Bott, 2017). Bott and Chemla 
(2016) used a sentence-to-picture paradigm where participants selected one of two 
pictures based on their interpretation of a sentence (based on Raffray & Pickering, 2010). 
The sentence-picture combination was such that in some prime trials participants were 
obliged to derive an enriched interpretation (a scalar implicature) of the sentence in order 
to select the correct card and in other prime trials no enrichment was required. In the 
target trials the sentence-picture combination was ambiguous with respect to enrichment 
and thus provided participants with the choice to enrich their interpretation of the 
sentence or not. Participants were more likely to derive the enrichment in the target trial 
if the prime trial had obliged the derivation of an enrichment. Scalar implicatures are 
typically thought of as pragmatic. That they can be primed, just as syntactic structures can 
be, suggests that there are representations specific to pragmatic enrichments. We make 
use of the primability of scalar implicatures to investigate the nature of pragmatic 
enrichments.  
Chapter overview 
Chapter 2:  The role of alternative salience in the derivation of scalar implicatures. 
This chapter presents work extending that of Bott and Chemla (2016). Implicature 
derivation is often characterised as a two-step process in which the alternatives are 
identified and then negated. However, the independence of these two processes is unclear. 
We test between two models in an attempt to clarify this. In the first model the 
identification and use of alternatives are not independent processes. The derivation of 
implicatures depends upon the identification (or salience) of the alternatives. Once the 
alternative is sufficiently salient an implicature arises. We call this the salience model. In 
the second model the identification and use of alternatives are two distinct stages. The 
derivation of implicatures requires the alternative to be salient and an independent usage 
mechanism must also be salient. We call this the combination model. We present three 
experiments using a structural priming paradigm with alternatives and implicatures as 
primes. We show that adults can be primed to derive implicatures when the alternative is 
the prime and that this occurs at an equal rate to when the implicature is the prime. We 
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interpret these findings as evidence in favour of the salience model and suggest that there 
is not an independent usage mechanism. 
The work presented in this chapter has been published as Rees, A & Bott, L (2018). 
The role of alternative salience in the derivation of scalar implicatures, Cognition, 176, 1-
14. 
Chapter 3: Deriving ad hoc implicatures. This chapter focuses on a particular type of 
enrichment known as ad hoc implicatures. Ad hoc implicatures differ from prototypical 
scalar implicatures because they are contextually based and thus do not have a clearly 
defined set of alternatives in the same way that, for example, quantifiers do. Nevertheless, 
similar priming effects are seen in ad hoc implicatures. In this chapter we aim to first 
investigate how priming affects the processing of implicatures since previous priming 
investigations have relied on metalinguistic judgement tasks. Secondly, we test between 
two explanations for how ad hoc implicatures are derived. The first explanation is that 
temporary ad hoc scales are constructed to provide the necessary alternatives for ad hoc 
implicatures to be derived. The alternative approach is that rather than involving specific 
contextually based alternatives there is a general “anything else” representation which is 
negated in order to derive the implicature. We present one reaction time and two eye 
tracking experiments to address these questions. We show that priming has a facilitatory 
effect on implicature processing, as reflected in faster reaction times, and that rather than 
generating scales on an ad hoc basis individuals make use of a general “anything else” 
representation. 
Experiments 2 and 3 from this chapter appear in Rees, A & Bott, L (2017). A visual 
world priming study of Gricean implicatures. The Technical Report of Language and Thought 
of the Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers, 117 (149), 109-
114. 
Chapter 4: Structural alignment of pragmatic enrichment in dialogue. In this chapter 
we focus on implicatures from a speaker’s perspective. Much of the research into 
implicatures focuses on how a listener derives the implicature and does not consider the 
factors which may influence the speaker’s choice to use the implicatures. We extend work 
showing that during dialogue speakers become aligned with respect to their syntactic 
choices and investigate whether speakers also become aligned with respect to pragmatics. 
That is, we look whether interlocutors become aligned in their use of implicatures. We 
present four experiments that use a confederate scripting priming paradigm and show 
that speakers do become aligned.  
  Introduction 
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Role of the Alternative 
16 
 
Chapter 2: The role of alternative salience in the derivation of 
scalar implicatures. 
People often communicate much more than they explicitly say. For example, 
consider the following exchanges. 
(1) A: Are John and Mary coming to the party?  
B: John is. 
=>Mary is not. 
(2) I ate four doughnuts. 
=> I ate exactly four doughnuts. 
(3) Betty passed some of her exams. 
=> Betty passed some but not all of her exams. 
In (1), B answers A’s question about John coming to the party. Although B has not 
explicitly answered A’s query about Mary’s attendance, his utterance communicates that 
Mary is not coming. In (2), the listener can infer that the speaker ate exactly four 
doughnuts, even though the speaker did not explicitly say exactly four, and in (3), the 
listener can conclude that Betty passed some but not all of her exams, even though the 
speaker did not explicitly say not all.  
Enrichments such as those above are commonly known as scalar implicatures. In 
each case the listener generated an enriched meaning based on the alternative to what the 
speaker said, that is, something that the speaker could have said but did not. There are 
many accounts of how implicatures can be derived but most assume something like the 
following, inspired by Grice (1989): (i) The listener computes the basic meaning of an 
utterance, (ii) recognises that an alternative phrase could have been used, (iii) negates the 
alternative, and (iv) combines this with the basic meaning. For example, in (1), Speaker A 
recognises that B could have said “John and Mary are coming to the party” (the 
alternative). Since B did not say this, and assuming that she is being cooperative, A can 
infer that “John and Mary are coming to the party” is not true. Thus, combining what is 
said, John is coming to the party, with the negation of the alternative, it is not the case that 
John and Mary are coming to the party, the listener arrives at the meaning that John but 
not Mary is coming to the party. Similar reasoning can be used to derive the enrichment 
seen in the other examples. In (2), since the speaker said four the listener can infer that 
not five, not six, not seven is the case, and conclude that the speaker means four but no 
more. In (3) the speaker could have said all, but since they did not, the speaker can infer 
not all.  
Role of the Alternative 
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Implicatures are optional: the listener chooses whether to incorporate an 
implicature into the sentence meaning. For example, in (3), if the preceding discourse had 
been about whether Betty would pass any of her exams, the listener would likely not 
derive the not all inference (since the not all part would be largely irrelevant). 
Understanding how and why certain contexts cause people to enrich the basic meaning of 
expressions has been a fundamental research goal in pragmatics (e.g. Chierchia, 2013; 
Geurts, 2010; Grice, 1989; Horn, 1972; 1989; Levinson, 2000) and psycholinguistics (e.g. 
Bott, Bailey, & Grodner, 2012; Bott & Chemla, 2016; Bott & Noveck, 2004; Breheny, Katsos 
& Williams, 2006; Breheny, Ferguson & Katsos, 2013; Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015; Gotzner, 
Wartenburger, & Spalek, 2016; Grodner, Klein, Carbary, & Tanenhaus, 2010; Huang & 
Snedeker, 2009a; Tomlinson, Bailey & Bott, 2013). In our study we address the role of the 
alternative in this process. We test whether the salience of the alternative entirely 
determines whether an expression will be enriched, or whether an additional, 
independent usage mechanism is justified.  
Combination and salience models of implicature 
Most researchers agree that there are two stages to the implicature process. The 
first is that a relevant alternative is retrieved from the lexicon or the context, or 
constructed. The second is that this alternative is negated and combined with the basic 
meaning of the sentence. However, it is not clear how the second stage depends on the 
first. The second stage could apply automatically once the first stage is complete, so that 
the implicature is always derived if the alternative is sufficiently salient, or the second 
stage could be activated independently of the first. We refer to the former possibility as 
the salience model, since the implicature depends purely on the salience of the alternative, 
and the latter as the combination model, since the implicature depends on a combination of 
the salience of the alternative and the activation of an independent usage mechanism that 
uses the alternative, i.e. negates the alternative (see Figure 1)3. 
  
                                                          
3 QUD in Figure 1 refers to question under discussion which is one possible factor that contributes 
to activation. 
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Figure 1. Salience and combination models. Alternatives have varying levels of activation. For the 
salience model, the usage mechanism is automatically applied after the alternatives obtain sufficient 
activation to exceed a threshold but for the combination model, the alternatives and the usage 
mechanism are required to exceed a threshold. Note that both models have the same number of 
processing steps but the combination model assumes the usage mechanism can be independently 
activated whereas the salience model does not. 
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Both models assume that alternatives have varying degrees of activation. For the 
salience model, if the activation of any one alternative exceeds a threshold, the usage 
mechanism will be applied, and the implicature will be computed. The usage mechanism is 
not modulated independently of the activation of the alternatives. The combination model 
also assumes that the alternatives have varying degrees of activation and a threshold, but 
additionally assumes that the usage mechanism does. For the salience model, contextual 
factors (e.g., the question under discussion, whether alternatives have been mentioned in 
the discourse, speaker knowledge) affect the activation levels of the alternatives, but for 
the combination model, contextual factors affect activation levels of the alternatives 
and/or the usage mechanism, independently. Both models explain how the implicature 
arise in some circumstances but not others. For example, in (1) the salience model 
explains the implicature by assuming that the alternative (John and Mary are going to the 
party) is sufficiently active that it exceeds the threshold necessary to trigger the usage 
mechanism and so generate the implicature. The combination model also requires 
alternatives to be sufficiently active but additionally assumes that the usage mechanism is 
active. Similarly, consider a situation where an implicature would not arise. In (1), assume 
that B knows information about John but knows nothing about Mary, and the listener is 
aware of this. Under these conditions the not Mary implicature does not arise (the 
competency assumption; see Grice, 1989, and Sauerland, 2004). The salience model 
explains the absence of implicatures by assuming that the absence of speaker knowledge 
suppresses activation levels of the alternatives to such a degree that the usage mechanism 
is not triggered. The combination model explains this by assuming either that the 
alternatives are not sufficiently active, or that speaker knowledge directly suppresses the 
usage mechanism. The crucial difference between the two is that with the independent 
usage mechanism, the combination model has an extra method of accommodating 
contextual factors, such as speaker knowledge or alternative relevance. 
Implicature theories from the formal pragmatics literature can be broadly mapped 
on to the salience/combination distinction. Among the salience models are Grice’s original 
account and its more recent developments, the Neo-Gricean models (Horn, 1972; 
Levinson, 2000). Grice’s account assumes that if there is linguistic material that is relevant 
and more informative than the basic expression, this material should be designated an 
alternative. Subsequently the alternative is combined with the basic meaning of the 
sentence using domain general reasoning processes. Because there is no mechanism for 
blocking the implicature from arising after the alternative has been made active, the usage 
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mechanism should not be thought of as independent from the activation of the alternative. 
Thus Grice’s model can be classified as a salience model. While Neo-Gricean accounts 
provide more detail on how the alternative is formed, the basic assumptions regarding the 
automatic application of the usage mechanism are the same. There is no mechanism 
proposed for blocking the implicature after the alternative has been identified and so the 
usage mechanism cannot be considered independent. This seems particularly clear with 
regards to Levinson, who presents extensive arguments in favour of implicatures being 
the result of default reasoning processes. If a usage mechanism were able to block the 
implicature from arising in certain contexts, the system would no longer be a default 
model. Recent grammatical models of implicatures should also be considered salience 
models for the same reason. Indeed, Chierchia et al. (2012) explicitly identify with a 
salience model, “providing alternatives are active, such alternatives are obligatorily 
factored into meaning… if the alternatives are not active the plain unenriched meaning is 
used and no scalar implicature comes about.” (p.2304).  
Other formal accounts are more readily mapped onto combination models. These 
typically assume an independent usage mechanism to explain the effects of relevance or 
speaker knowledge. Sauerland (2004) and the structural theory of alternatives (Katzir, 
2007; Fox & Katzir, 2011) could sensibly be implemented in this way. According to 
Sauerland, upon encountering an utterance such as (3) “Betty passed some of her exams”, 
individuals first compute a primary implicature, in which the speaker is assumed to be 
uncertain about whether a stronger statement holds e.g. it is not the case that the speaker 
believes that Betty passed all of her exams. Under the right epistemic conditions, the 
primary implicature is then strengthened to a secondary implicature e.g. the speaker 
believes that it is not the case that Betty passed all of her exams. An independent usage 
mechanism could be linked to the assessment of epistemic context so that it is only 
activated when the context is appropriate. 
Structural theories of alternatives also assume multiple steps in the derivation 
process. For Fox and Katzir (2011), the set of alternatives is first determined by structural 
linguistic or discourse factors (e.g. sentence complexity) but at a later stage, 
conversational relevance filters out inappropriate alternatives. As with Sauerland, an 
obvious implementation of this would be for relevance to affect the probability of the 
usage mechanism being activated. More generally, researchers often describe the 
implicature process as a series of discrete stages (e.g. Breheny, Ferguson, & Katsos, 2013; 
Geurts, 2010; Katsos & Bishop, 2011), with the usage mechanism described as separate 
from the identification of alternatives. For example, Katsos and Bishop (2011) say, “The 
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first step involves determining whether the speaker could have made a more informative 
statement….The second step involves the negation of the more informative statement that 
was identified in the first step.” (p. 68). Similarly, Breheny, Ferguson, and Katsos include 
speaker knowledge as a separate step in implicature generation (Table 1, p.424). While we 
doubt these researchers are committed to a combination model, the exposition implies 
some degree of independence between the formation of the alternatives and their 
negation, such that the usage mechanism might be affected by factors other than the 
salience of the alternatives. 
The forgoing discussion demonstrates that both salience and combination models 
are plausible implementations of formal pragmatic models. There is no reason to choose 
one model over the other on the basis of a consensus in the formal literature. However, the 
models discussed above were not intended as mechanistic, psychological accounts and in 
many cases the question of whether there is an independent usage mechanisms depends 
more on implementation than the structural properties of the theory. For example, we 
classed Fox and Katzir (2011) as a combination model, but conversational relevance might 
act to prune the set of alternatives as part of the initial stage of alternative generation, 
rather than the later stage of alternative usage. Consequently Fox and Katzir could still be 
implemented in a system where the usage mechanism was automatically activated on the 
basis of the activation levels of the alternatives.  We therefore emphasise that we are not 
testing any particular formal model but the broad implementation principles behind the 
salience/combination distinction. 
Alternatives in scalar implicatures 
There have been no previous attempts to test between the salience and combination 
models but there is experimental evidence of the importance of the alternative more 
generally. Much of this comes from the developmental literature. Developmental data 
suggest that children have difficulty generating scalar implicatures (e.g. Huang & 
Snedeker, 2009b; Noveck, 2001; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003) and there is now 
converging evidence that at least part of the reason is children’s difficulty in generating 
appropriate alternatives (Barner, Brooks, & Bale, 2011; Chierchia, Crain, Guasti, Gualmini, 
& Meroni, 2001; Gualmini et al., 2001; Skordos & Papafragou, 2016).  
A particularly convincing example of this is Skordos and Papafragou (2016). They 
tested whether the accessibility and relevance of alternatives affected five-year-old’s 
ability to generate scalar implicatures. Children completed a sentence-picture verification 
task where children were presented with a picture and had to judge the felicity of the 
description provided. The critical sentences were underinformative statements involving 
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some. Accessibility of the alternative was manipulated by varying the order of trials. In the 
mixed condition trials using some and all were intermixed so that all was accessible during 
the evaluation of some. In the some-first condition all of the trials using some were 
presented before trials using all. When the alternative, all, was made more accessible to 
children they derived more scalar implicatures than when the alternatives were not 
accessible. Consistent with Barner, Brooks, and Bale (2011), this result demonstrates that 
the accessibility of the alternative partly determines whether children derive the 
implicature. Skordos and Papafragou go further than demonstrating that accessiblity is 
important, however. In later experiments they show that the alternative needs to be 
relevant, as well as accessible. Relevance was determined by the sentence evaluation 
criteria. In the all relevant condition, the task required children to process the quantifier 
to determine whether the sentence was true, whereas in the all irrelevant condition, they 
heard the same sentences but the composition of the picture meant that the quantifier was 
not relevant (the truth of the sentence depended on only the predicate). Skordos and 
Papafragou observed higher rates of the implicature in the all relevant condition than the 
all irrelevant condition, even though all was accessible in both cases. A further experiment 
revealed that an equally high rate of implicatures was derived when a relevant none was 
used instead of all. 
Skordos and Papafragou (2016) provide an important demonstration of how 
children are influenced by the salience of the alternative. Their results are consistent with 
the salience and the combination model, however. The salience model could explain the 
results by claiming that all was made more active in conditions where there was a high 
rate of implicatures. In Experiment 1, repeated processing of all in the all condition raised 
activation levels; in Experiment 2, depth of processing for all was greater in the relevant 
condition than the irrelevant condition, and activation levels were greater as a 
consequence; and in Experiment 3, the semantic association between none and all raised 
activation levels of all (more generally, the set of quantifiers was activated when the 
question-under-discussion was recognised as being about quantifiers).  
While there is general agreement that the salience of the alternatives is important in 
the adult processing literature, alternatives have received far less direct interest than in 
the developmental literature. Indirect evidence of the role of the alternative salience is 
given by Chemla and Bott (2014). They tested whether free choice inferences were a form 
of complex scalar implicatures using a sentence verification task. In one block participants 
completed a free choice task where they were presented with a scenario and a sentence 
using disjunction and had to judge the truth of the sentence based on their knowledge and 
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the scenario. The veracity of the sentence depended upon whether or not participants 
derived a free choice inference. In the other block participants completed a similar task 
but using scalar implicatures rather than free choice inferences. Chemla and Bott found 
that while scalar implicatures were delayed relative to literal controls (replicating Bott & 
Noveck, 2004), free choice inferences were not. They concluded that either free choice 
inferences were a completely different phenomenon from scalar implicatures, or that the 
alternatives used to derive free choice inferences were sufficiently salient to the 
participant that retrieving them was not a costly process. Under the latter explanation, the 
cost observed when people derive scalar implicatures can at least partially be explained by 
the inaccessibility of the alternative. If the alternatives are salient, implicatures can be 
computed quickly, whereas if the alternatives are not as salient, implicatures will cause a 
processing delay (see also van Tiel and Schaeken, 2016). While this theory relates to 
processing cost, and not implicature rates, it nonetheless suggests that alternative salience 
is important for adult processing of implicatures.   
Bott and Chemla (2016) also argued that the salience of the alternative was 
important. They tested whether people could be primed to derive scalar implicatures, in 
the same way that they can be primed to produce particular syntactic structures (e.g., 
Bock, 1986; Bock, Dell, Chang, & Onishi, 2007; Branigan, Pickering, & Cleland, 2000; 
Thothathiri & Snedeker, 2008; see Pickering & Ferreira, 2008 for a review). Participants 
saw prime trials, in which they derived either an implicature interpretation (a strong 
interpretation) or a non-implicature interpretation (a weak interpretation), and target 
trials in which the sentence was ambiguous between a strong and a weak interpretation. 
Target trials appeared subsequent to prime trials. They found that the prime sentence 
influenced the interpretation assigned to the target sentence such that a strong prime trial 
led to more strong target interpretations than a weak prime trial. They proposed several 
explanations for the priming effect but one involved the strong prime making the 
alternative more salient to the participant, which in turn elevated the rate of implicatures.  
In summary, there is a range of evidence suggesting that the salience of alternatives 
is important for deriving scalar implicatures but little direct evidence to distinguish 
between the salience model and the combination model. In our study we provide a direct 
test between them. The logic is explained in the next section. 
Retaining activation levels across time 
The salience and the combination models are not easy to distinguish empirically. 
Variable activation levels of the alternatives can explain many findings, and these are 
present in both models. To test between them then we make a further assumption about 
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the usage mechanism. We suggest that just as the alternatives maintain activation levels 
across time, the usage mechanism also maintains activation levels across time. This means 
that if the usage mechanism has been used earlier in the discourse, activation levels should 
remain high, and if it has been suppressed, they should remain low. The rationale for this 
assumption comes from research on structural priming (see Pickering & Ferreira, 2008; 
and Branigan & Pickering, 2017, for reviews). These studies demonstrate that many 
linguistic structures maintain activation levels in just this way (e.g. active and passive 
syntactic structures, Bencini & Valian, 2008; transitive and dative syntactic forms, Bock 
1986; animacy assignments, Bock, Loebell, & Morey, 1992; conceptual level structures for 
configurations in a maze, Garrod & Anderson, 1987; scopal interpretations with “every”, 
Raffray & Pickering, 2010, and Chemla & Bott, 2014). For example, Branigan and Pickering 
(1998) showed that when a confederate used a double object structure to describe a 
picture (“give the man the book”), participants were more likely use a double object 
structure in subsequent trials than a prepositional structure (“give the book to the man”). 
Activation levels of the double object structure were retained across time so that when the 
participant needed to choose a structure, the double object structure was more active than 
the prepositional structure.  
The consequence of assuming that activation levels are maintained across time and 
linguistic space is that the combination model now predicts the usage mechanism can be 
primed by recent use. If the usage mechanism has been used recently in the discourse, it 
should have higher activation levels than if it has not. Since higher activation levels 
translate as a greater probability that the usage mechanism will be triggered (see Figure 
1), the more recent the application of the usage mechanism, the more likely the usage 
mechanism is to be applied to the current interpretation. The basic logic of our design 
follows that of researchers in structural priming who claim that the presence of a priming 
effect reflects the presence of a structure, and conversely, the absence of a priming effect 
reflects the absence of a structure (Branigan & Pickering, 2017; Pickering & Ferreira, 
2008). 
In our study we adapted Bott and Chemla’s (2016) paradigm to test whether the 
usage mechanism can be primed. A priming effect would support the combination model, 
and the absence of one would support the salience model. 
Current Study 
Participants completed a picture-sentence matching task. They were presented with 
two pictures and a sentence and had to select which picture best matched the sentence. 
Participants’ interpretation of the sentence was indicated by their picture selection. There 
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were prime trials and target trials. Target trials were presented immediately after prime 
trials. The correct interpretation of the sentence in prime trials was unambiguous, but in 
target trials participants could choose between an implicature reading (a strong 
interpretation) and a non-implicature reading (a weak interpretation). A priming effect 
was shown when the type of prime trial influenced the interpretation of the target trial. 
There were three types of prime: strong, weak, and alternative. In strong and weak 
prime trials, sentences contained a scalar trigger term, e.g. “some” (see Figure 2). In 
alternative prime trials, sentences contained a more informative alternative to the scalar 
term, e.g. “all”. In strong trials, the picture configuration meant that the most relevant 
interpretation was a strong reading (implicature) e.g. some but not all. In weak trials the 
relevant interpretation was a weak reading (non-implicature) e.g. some and possibly all, 
and in alternative prime trials, the relevant interpretation was the alternative reading, e.g., 
all.  
Target trials consisted of a picture corresponding to the weak interpretation of the 
sentence, and a picture with the words, “Better Picture?” (modelled on the “hidden box” 
paradigm of  Huang, Spelke, & Snedeker, 2013; see Figure 2). If participants felt that there 
was a picture that better matched the sentence than the one shown, they could select the 
“Better Picture” option. Thus, weak interpretations of the sentence were measured by 
selecting the weak picture and strong interpretations by selecting the “Better Picture” 
option. Priming of scalar implicatures occurred when there were more strong target 
interpretations subsequent to a strong prime than a weak prime.  
Three categories of expression were used: quantifiers, numerals, and ad hoc 
constructions. All three are argued by some authors to be types of scalar implicature (e.g., 
Hirschberg, 1991; Horn, 1972, 1989; van Rooij & Schulz, 2006). In particular, sentences 
using these expressions admit strong and weak readings and the strong reading can be 
derived using a Gricean reasoning process. For example, the weak interpretation of “There 
is a V” is there is a V and possibly other letters, and a relevant alternative (in the context 
presented in Figure 2) is “There is a V and a C.”  Combining the negation of the alternative, 
there is not a V and a C, with the basic meaning of the sentence, there is a V and possibly 
other letters, yields the strong meaning, there is a V and nothing else. A similar reasoning 
process applies to the numbers. We used a range of scalar implicature expressions, rather 
than the prototypical some, because we wanted to test whether our findings applied to a 
range of scalar trigger expressions. 
According to both the salience and the combination models, alternative and strong 
prime trials should increase the salience of the alternative relative to the weak prime 
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trials. In the alternative trials, the alternative is made explicitly available, and in the strong 
trials, the alternative is made implicitly available by forcing the participant to derive a 
scalar implicature. Therefore the rate of implicature in target trials should be higher 
following alternative and strong prime trials than weak trials. The models make different 
predictions for the priming caused by the strong relative to the alternative prime, 
however. The salience model assumes that the rate of implicature is entirely dependent 
upon the activation of the alternative. Since the alternative prime makes the alternative 
active, and the strong prime also makes the alternative active (via the scalar implicature), 
the alternative and the strong prime should lead to equal rates of implicature. In contrast, 
the combination model assumes that activation of alternatives is only one component of 
what determines whether an implicature is derived. The other is activation of the usage 
mechanism. Assuming the usage mechanism maintains its activation levels across trials 
(as described above), it should continue to be active after a strong prime (which triggers 
the usage mechanism), but not an alternative prime (which does not). For the combination 
model then, the alternative prime should raise the activation of the alternative, leading to 
a certain amount of priming, but the strong prime should raise the activation of the 
alternative and of the usage mechanism, subsequently leading to more priming than the 
alternative alone. Thus the combination model predicts greater priming following the 
strong prime trials than the alternative prime trials.  
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Figure 2. Example primes and target for each implicature category. Left to right: some, ad hoc, and number. Primes top to bottom: strong, weak, and 
alternative.
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Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
One-hundred Cardiff University undergraduate students participated for course 
credit (93 female, average age 19.4 years). All participants were native English speakers. 
Materials 
Each trial consisted of a sentence presented above two pictures. Participants had to 
match the sentence to one of the pictures. Pictures consisted of rectangles containing 
either letters or the text “Better Picture?”  
Three expression categories were used: some, number, and ad hoc. The expressions 
have a weak meaning that can be enriched to form the strong meaning. Table 1 shows 
example expressions, together with plausible alternatives and the subsequent implicature. 
Implicature category Expression Alternative Implicature 
Some Some All Some but not all 
Number There are N N+1,+2… N exactly 
Ad hoc There is an X X and Y There is an X and nothing more 
Table 1. Experimental stimuli.  
Prime trials consisted of two pictures with letters inside. There were one, two, four, 
six, or nine letters depending upon the implicature category of the prime. Pictures with 
letters could either be strong, weak, or false depending upon the predicate of the sentence.  
Strong prime trials involved a strong and a weak picture. Strong primes involved a 
strong and a weak picture, and weak prime trials involved a false and a weak picture. 
Alternative primes had the same picture configuration as strong primes (see below for 
description of picture configurations).  
For each implicature category there were two possible sentence frames (see below). 
One was used in the strong and the weak primes and the other was used in the alternative 
prime trials. As a result of this, although the types of pictures used in the alternative 
primes were the same as those in the strong primes, the sentence frame meant that 
alternative primes had a false and a weak picture rather than a strong and a weak picture. 
Some prime trials. For some prime trials the sentence frames were “Some of the 
letters are [letter]” for strong and weak primes and “All of the letters are [letter]” for 
alternative prime trials. The two pictures in some prime trials contained nine letters. 
These pictures could be strong, weak, or false depending on the sentence predicate. The 
nine letters in strong pictures were made up of six letters which matched the predicate 
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and three other letters. Weak pictures contained nine letters that matched the predicate. 
False pictures also contained nine but these were different from the predicate. 
Number prime trials. Strong and weak prime trials used the sentence frame “There 
are four [letter]’s”. Alternative trials used “There are six [letter]’s”. Strong pictures 
contained four letters, weak pictures contained six letters, and false pictures contained 
two letters. All of the letters matched the predicate.   
Ad hoc prime trials. The sentence frame in strong and weak prime trials was “There 
is a [letter]”. The alternative trials used “There is a [letter] and a [letter]”. Pictures 
contained either one or two letters. Strong pictures contained a single letter. Weak and 
false pictures contained two letters. The letter in the strong picture was the same as the 
predicate. Weak pictures contained one letter that was the same as the predicate and one 
that was different. Both of the letters in false pictures were different from the predicate. 
Target trials. Target trials also contained two pictures. One contained letters and 
was a weak picture. The other was a “Better Picture” option, similar to the covered box 
paradigm (e.g. Huang et al., 2013). The sentence frame in target trials was the same as the 
one used in strong and weak prime trials. Consequently, if participants selected the picture 
with letters this was consistent with a weak (non-implicature) interpretation of the 
sentence. Selecting the “Better Picture” option corresponded to a strong (implicature) 
interpretation. 
Design 
There were three types of expression (some, number, ad hoc). For each there were 
three types of prime (strong, weak, alternative). Consequently there were 3 (expression) x 
3 (prime) = 9 conditions. 
There were two primes for every target. This was done to boost the effect of the 
prime. Thus an experimental item was a triplet of two primes and a target. In prime trials 
the position of the correct picture was systematically varied (left or right) to prevent 
participants from becoming biased to pictures in a particular position. The positions were 
crossed so that there were 4 patterns of correct responses across the two prime trials 
(left-left, right-right, left-right, or right-left). Consequently each condition had four prime 
combinations. This resulted in 4 (combinations) x 9 (conditions) x 3 (triplets) = 108 
experimental trials. Triplet presentation was randomised so that the order was different 
for each participant.  
Thirty-six single filler trials were included. Filler trials were a mixture of prime and 
target trials which were indistinguishable from their experimental counterparts. The only 
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difference between filler and experimental target trials was that instead of a weak picture 
the filler trial had a false picture. The false picture had the same configuration as a weak 
picture but the letters were inconsistent with the sentence predicate. The filler target 
trials would therefore give participants the opportunity to select “Better Picture” and thus 
consider this as an acceptable response. 
Procedure 
The experiment was run as an online questionnaire using Qualtrics Survey Software. 
Participants were told to “select the picture which best matches the sentence” and to 
select the “Better Picture” option if the picture did not match the sentence. Participants 
were shown examples of prime and target trials with the correct image selected. The 
examples were accompanied by an explanation of why the selection was correct. 
Participants responded by clicking a box under the appropriate picture with the 
mouse. Participants then clicked the “next” button to show the next trial. 
Results 
Analysis Procedure 
Responses to target trials were removed if the corresponding prime trial was not 
answered correctly. In Experiment 1, 4% of the data was removed for this reason. 
Consequently, during pairwise comparisons these participants were not included in the 
analysis. The remaining data underwent a logit transformation. 
Data were analysed using 3x3 ANOVA with prime type (strong, weak, and 
alternative) and expression (some, ad hoc, and number) as within-subjects factors. We 
used Bayes factors to interpret the nonsignificant findings (Dienes, 2011, 2014; Rouder, 
Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). We used the default JZS prior (Rouder et al., 
2009) for all analyses. The JZS prior is a non-informative objective prior that minimises 
assumptions regarding expected effect size. Bayes factors using the JZS prior (0.707) were 
calculated using JASP (JASP Team, 2016). Bayes factors > 3 suggest ‘substantial’ evidence 
for the alternative hypothesis and Bayes factors < 0.33 indicate ‘substantial’ evidence for 
the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2011, 2014).  
Analysis and Discussion 
Figure 3 shows the rate of implicature to targets as a function of prime and 
expression. Three patterns are noteworthy. First, the overall rate of implicature varied 
across expressions, as shown by a main effect of expression, F(2, 186) = 51.64, p < .001.  
For ad hoc expressions, there was a clear bias towards the weak interpretation, whereas 
for some and the numbers the split was more even (although still biased towards weak 
interpretations). This pattern corresponds with our intuitions, in that the weak 
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interpretation seems particularly salient for the ad hoc expressions, but it is not obvious 
what causes this result. We return to explanations of this effect in the General Discussion. 
Second, rates of strong interpretations were higher following strong and alternative 
prime trials than weak primes, as shown by the main effect of prime, F (2, 186) = 32.24, p 
< .001. Planned comparisons showed that rates of implicature were significantly higher 
following strong primes than weak primes, t (99) = 6.67, p < .001, illustrating the basic 
priming effect observed by Bott and Chemla (2016). There was also significantly greater 
rates of implicature following alternative primes than weak primes, t (99) = 6.69, p < .001. 
Finally, there was no difference between rate of implicature following strong and 
alternative primes, t (99) = .13, p =.89, BF = 0.11. That the BF was less than 0.33 suggests 
strong support for the null hypothesis, and consequently, support for the salience model. 
 
Figure 3. Proportion of strong (implicature) responses to target trials by expression. Error bars 
show standard error. 
While there was no significant interaction between prime and expression F (4, 372) 
= 2.00, p = .094, BF = 1.84), the BF suggests that the experiment was insensitive in this 
respect. We therefore considered each expression separately. As Figure 3 shows, the same 
pattern was found across each. There were significantly higher rates of implicature 
following strong and alternative primes than weak primes for ad hoc, number, and some 
expressions, t (95)’s > 2.69, p’s < .009; t (99)’s > 4.38, p’s < .001; t (97)’s > 4.51, p’s < .001, 
respectively, and no difference between strong and alternative primes across expressions, 
t (95) = .44, p = .66, BF = 0.12; t(99) = .20, p = .84, BF = 0.11; t (97) = .94, p = .35, BF = 0.17. 
In short, the data suggest that the alternative prime was just as effective as the strong 
prime, regardless of whether the expressions were considered separately or as a whole. 
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Individual participant details 
It is possible that the priming effects reported above were due to participants 
changing interpretation only once during the experiment. Perhaps a participant started 
the experiment with a particular interpretation, strong or weak, but then switched to a 
different one after they realised that in this particular context the opposite interpretation 
was more appropriate. They then maintained the alternative interpretation throughout 
the experiment. This would be a global priming effect linked to particular experimental 
contexts, rather than a local priming effect. To investigate this we examined how often 
individual participants switched from one interpretation to another across the 
experiment. Figure 4 shows the results.  
 
Figure 4. Frequency of response changes. 
Consider first the some expressions. Out of 100 hundred participants, 31% 
maintained the same interpretation throughout the experiment (either strong or weak). A 
further 11% changed only once, but the remaining 68% changed at least twice, such as 
from strong to weak and back again to strong. The results for the numbers are similar. 
Around a third could not be primed at all, but around two thirds changed interpretation at 
least twice. There were more participants who could not be primed for the ad hoc 
expressions, 62%, and 12% changed only once, but nonetheless 26% changed at least 
twice. The average priming effects consequently cannot be due to participants changing 
their interpretations once only.  
Discussion 
There were significantly more strong interpretations after a strong prime than a 
weak prime, replicating Bott and Chemla (2016), and significantly more after the 
alternative than the weak prime. Crucially, the rate of strong interpretations did not differ 
between the strong and alternative interpretations, and the Bayes Factor analysis suggests 
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that this was not because the experiment was insensitive to reasonable effect sizes. 
Consequently the result supports the salience model. 
The findings from Experiment 1 suggest that alternative and strong prime trials 
raised the activation of the alternative so that on subsequent target trials, participants 
were more likely to derive scalar implicatures. In Experiment 2 we test a different 
explanation based on the visual structure of the pictures. 
Experiment 2 
The strong and alternative primes in Experiment 1 exposed participants to a strong 
picture. For example, the strong some prime and the alternative some prime exposed 
participants to a picture with nine letters, three of which were different to the others 
(some but not all). In contrast, the weak prime did not expose participants to a strong 
picture. Thus, a possible explanation for our findings (and those of Bott & Chemla, 2016), 
is that exposure to the strong picture caused participants to reject the weak option in the 
target trial. Perhaps participants became aware that a strong interpretation of the target 
sentence was possible after having seen a strong picture. While this explanation is similar 
to the salience explanation, it assigns the locus of the effect to the pictures, and not the 
sentence interpretation, and to an awareness of a strong interpretation, and not the 
alternative. 
To test the strong picture explanation we altered the false picture configuration for 
weak primes. Weak primes now consisted of a weak picture and a false strong picture, that 
is, a picture that had a strong configuration but was false by virtue of the sentence 
predicate. Thus all three primes involved a strong configuration picture. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred participants took part. Fifty participants were recruited online (via 
Prolific.ac.uk) and were paid, and fifty students were recruited for course credit from 
Cardiff University. Demographic information is only available for the online participants 
(29 male, average age 25.6 years). All stated they were native English speakers. 
Design and Procedure 
The design and procedure were the same as for Experiment 1 except for the 
construction of the weak primes. Weak primes consisted of a weak picture and a false 
picture, but unlike Experiment 1, the false picture had a strong configuration. The letters 
in the false picture were inconsistent with the sentence predicate (see Figure 5).  
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Figure 5. Change in weak prime stimuli from Experiment 1. 
Results 
Target trials with an incorrect preceding prime trial were removed from the 
analysis, as in Experiment 1. This accounted for 3% of the data. The remaining data 
underwent a logit transformation.  
The main findings from Experiment 1 were replicated (see Figure 6). There was a 
main effect of prime type, F (2, 184) = 49.56 p < .001, and expression, F (2, 184) = 39.58, p 
< .001. The main effect of prime was caused by significantly lower implicature rates 
following the weak prime than following the strong or the alternative primes, t (99) = 7.60, 
p < .001 and t (99) = 8.35, p < .001 respectively, combined with no difference between 
rates of implicature following strong or alternative primes, t (99) = .13, p = .90, BF = 0.11, 
in support of the salience model. The main effect of expression was driven by significantly 
lower rates of implicature for the ad hoc expressions compared to the some and number 
expressions. Unlike Experiment 1, there was a significant interaction between prime type 
Role of the Alternative 
  
35 
 
and expression, F (4, 368) = 4.24, p = .002. We investigated this by testing the effect of the 
prime on each of the expressions. 
 
Figure 6. Proportion of strong (implicature) responses to target trials by expression. Error bars 
show standard error. 
The interaction was driven by a significantly smaller effect of the strong/alternative 
prime on the ad hoc expressions compared to the some and number expressions. This is 
likely caused by floor effects for the ad hoc implicatures (overall, rates of implicature were 
lower in this experiment than in Experiment 1). When we removed ad hoc expressions 
from the analysis the interaction was no longer significant F (4, 369) = 0.58, p = .56, BF = 
0.05. 
More importantly, the same pattern of priming was found across all the expressions, 
just as in Experiment 1. There were significantly higher rates of implicature following 
strong and alternative primes compared to weak primes t (94)’s > 2.66 p’s < .009, t (99)’s 
> 6.55, p’s < .001, t (97)’s > 4.92, p’s < .006, and there was no difference between strong 
and alternative primes across expressions, t (94) = 1.34, p = .18, BF = 1.31; t(99) = -.42, p = 
.68, BF = 0.12; t (97) = -.30, p = .77, BF = .29, for ad hoc, number, and some expressions, 
respectively, in support of the salience model. Note that although the Bayes Factor for ad 
hoc expressions suggests that there is only limited support for the null hypothesis, the 
potential effect is in the opposite direction to the prediction of the combination model. The 
combination model predicts a greater rate of implicature following a strong prime than an 
alternative prime, the opposite of the results here. 
Individual participant details 
We conducted a similar type of individual participants analysis as that in 
Experiment 1. Figure 7 shows the results. Overall the pattern is very similar to Experiment 
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1 although there is an increase in the number of participants who maintained the same 
response throughout the experiment. Nonetheless, for some and the numbers around half 
of participants changed their response at least twice in the experiment, and for ad hoc 
expressions 15% changed their response at least twice. As in Experiment 1 our results 
cannot be explained by participants changing response only once during the experiment.  
 
Figure 7. Frequency of response changes. 
Summary 
The priming effects we observed in Experiment 1 were replicated in Experiment 2. 
This provides more support for the salience model. Moreover, since the weak prime 
involved the same letter configurations as the strong prime, the priming effects cannot be 
explained solely by a visual priming effect. 
Overall the rate of implicature was lower here than in Experiment 1, by around 10% 
(compare Figure 6 with Figure 3). This occurred across all three expression types. Could 
the cause of the lower rates of implicature be due to the change in the weak prime? This 
seems unlikely because in Experiment 2 there were more images corresponding to a 
strong interpretation than in Experiment 1. If anything, more strong images should have 
raised the implicature rate because participants would have been more aware of what a 
“better picture” might be. Consequently we attribute the difference across experiments to 
sampling variability (see Antoniou, Cummins, & Katsos, 2016, for a discussion of 
individual differences in scalar implicatures).   
In Experiment 3 we test whether the priming effects might be due to a bias towards 
preserving a configuration->reference label mapping across trials. 
Role of the Alternative 
  
37 
 
Experiment 3 
Consider the weak some prime in Figure 2. Here, the correct picture is made up of 
nine letters of one type (Z’s). In the subsequent target trial the weak picture also has nine 
letters of the same type. Consequently, if the participant selects this picture they will have 
selected a picture with the same configuration (nine letters) and the same reference label 
(some) as the prime. In contrast, the correct response for the strong some prime has six 
letters of one type and three of another, but the weak picture in the target has nine letters 
of one type. If the participant selects the weak picture, they will have selected a card with a 
different configuration but the same label (some). This might feel incongruous because 
different pictures generally have different labels, and the participant might assume that 
since the label (some) is the same as the previous trial, the picture should also have the 
same configuration. Consequently they may prefer to select the “Better Picture” option. 
The strong-weak priming effect might therefore be explained by a desire to keep the 
configuration->reference label mapping consistent across trials. The alternative-weak 
priming effect can also be explained in this way. With the alternative some prime trial, the 
correct prime has nine letters, and the weak picture in the target trial also has nine letters. 
However, the label has changed between prime and target. In the prime trials, a picture 
with nine letters was described with the label all but in the target, a picture with nine 
letters was described with some. Thus, to maintain a consistent configuration->reference 
label mapping, the participant would select the “Better Picture” option. A similar form of 
reasoning can be used to explain the effects in the other expressions. 
To test this hypothesis we altered the target trials so that instead of a scalar 
sentence, such as, “Some of the letters are A’s,” they contained an alternative sentence, 
such as, “All of the letters are A’s” (see Figure 8). The target trials consisted of a weak 
picture, in which the letter configuration was consistent with the predicate (e.g., all nine 
letters were A’s), and the “Better Picture” option. The prime trials remained the same as in 
Experiment 2.  
 
Figure 8. Experiment 3 Target trial configuration for some, number, and ad hoc expressions. 
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Consequently, when target trials were preceded by strong primes both the correct 
prime picture and the label were different between prime and target. Hence the weak 
picture in the target trial could be selected without breaking the configuration->reference 
label mapping. Similarly, when target trials were preceded by alternative primes, the weak 
picture could also be selected since configuration and label would be consistent across 
prime and target. However, when target trials were preceded by weak primes, selection of 
the weak picture in the target would be inconsistent with preserving the configuration-
>reference label mapping. Both prime response and weak target response have the same 
configuration but they would use different labels (see Figure 9).  Hence in this case, a 
participant seeking to maintain a consistent mapping would choose the “Better Picture” 
option. The overall pattern of responding predicted by the configuration mapping 
hypothesis is that strong and alternative primes should lead to a low rate of “Better 
Picture” selections, while weak primes should lead to a high rate of “Better Picture” 
selections. 
 
Figure 9. Example weak prime->target for Experiment 3. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-five participants were recruited online from Prolific.ac.uk and were paid (15 
male, average age 34.7 years).  
Design and Procedure 
The design and procedure were the same as in Experiment 2. 
The sentence frame used in target trials was modified so that the sentence always 
used the alternative terms: some “All of the letters are [letter]”; number “Six of the letters 
are [letter]”; ad hoc “There is a [letter] and a [letter]”. 
Thirty-six filler trials were included. Twelve of the filler trials had a similar 
construction as target trials but consisted of a false picture and a “Better Picture” option. 
In these trials participants should always select the “Better Picture” option.  This was to 
ensure that participants considered the “Better Picture” as a valid choice in target trials. 
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The remaining fillers were indistinguishable from prime trials. As in previous 
experiments, they served to break up the prime-prime-target structure. 
Analysis and Discussion 
The proportion of “Better Picture” selections following alternative, strong, and weak 
primes was 0.00, 0.01, and 0.02 respectively (for comparison, “Better Picture” selections 
to the false filler trials were at ceiling, 1.00). If there were a strong bias towards 
maintaining a consistent configuration-> reference label mapping across trials we would 
have observed a large increase in “Better Picture” selections following the weak prime. 
Since we did not, we can be confident the effects we observed in Experiments 1 and 2 were 
not due to a similar bias.  
The configuration -> reference label hypothesis is part of a wider issue about visual 
similarity in priming tasks. Perhaps there is a general bias for people to select targets that 
are visually similar to the prime, irrespective of the sentence. In Experiments 1 and 2, the 
pattern of results we observed could be explained by an account along these lines. 
Participants chose the weak option in target trials after a weak and an alternative prime, 
which are structurally similar (e.g., in some trials, the weak prime has 9 identical letters, as 
does the weak target option), and the “Better picture” option after the strong prime, for 
which the weak target is not structurally similar (e.g., in some prime trials, the strong 
option has 6 letters of one type and three of another, but the weak option in the target 
does not). The results of Experiment 3 argue against this hypothesis, however. If visual 
similarity were the only explanation for the priming effect, strong primes should have 
been followed by a high rate of “Better Picture” responses (strong prime options differ 
substantially to the alternative target options) relative to weak and alternative primes 
(weak and alternative primes are structurally similar to the alternative target options), but 
these were not the results we observed. It might be possible to argue for a weak visual 
similarity account of our findings, however, in that the target cards were unambiguous in 
Experiment 3, and possibly the role of visual similarity is greatly weakened when the 
sentence is unambiguous. Our response is to note that the priming effects we observed in 
Experiments 1 and 2 were extremely large and if a visual bias were to exist, we would 
have expected to observe priming effects of some degree in Experiment 3, even if they 
were smaller effects, but we observed nothing at all. Furthermore, other researchers using 
extremely similar paradigms (but with ambiguous sentences) also conclude that visual 
similarity alone cannot explain their priming effects (see Bott & Chemla, 2014; Feiman & 
Snedeker, 2016; and Raffray & Pickering, 2010). 
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More generally, the results of Experiment 3 illustrate that the effects of the prime 
are restricted in ways that are theoretically sensible. The primes do not affect every target 
response. They only alter responses when there is a meaningful linguistic link between 
prime and target. Participants were not so influenced by a pragmatic need to please the 
experimenters that they altered their responses whenever they saw two consecutive 
primes, for example. Nor were they misunderstanding the role of the “Better Picture” 
option. They used the “Better Picture” option when they could think of a better picture 
that matched the meaning of the sentence, and not for other reasons.  
General Discussion 
This study tested between a salience model of implicature, in which the implicature 
decision is entirely determined by the activation of the alternative, and a combination 
model, in which an independent mechanism that uses the alternative also plays a role. 
While we found strong evidence that an active alternative primed implicatures, there was 
no evidence that the usage mechanism could also be primed. This pattern occurred in 
three types of scalar implicatures (some, numbers, and ad hoc) and across two 
experiments. We also conducted a third experiment to eliminate a possible relabelling 
explanation of the priming effect. Since none of our findings require the more complex, 
combination model, we favour the salience model. 
An obvious concern is that our conclusion is based on the absence of an effect rather 
than an observed effect. There are two, connected, issues here. First, how can we be sure 
that our experiments were sufficiently powerful to detect a reasonably sized effect? And 
second, how do we know how large the usage priming effect should be? The answer to 
these questions lies partly with the Bayes Factor (BF) analysis that we used to test the null 
findings. The logic behind the BF is that the experimental hypothesis (in this case that 
there is priming of the usage mechanism) makes effect size predictions, as does the null 
hypothesis (that there is no usage priming), and the BF is the ratio of the likelihood of the 
experimental hypothesis explaining the data to the likelihood of the null hypothesis 
explaining the data. Under the effect size assumptions we made, and the data we observed, 
the odds were much higher in favour of the null hypothesis than the experimental 
hypothesis. Note that standard frequency-based statistics (p-values from e.g. t-tests) do 
not allow researchers to state evidence in favour of the null hypothesis (Rouder et al., 
2009), as we do here, for a variety of reasons, such as the fact that p-values under the null 
hypothesis do not converge to a limit as sample size increases. With respect to the effect 
size, the analysis we report assumed an effect size distribution centred around a medium 
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effect (a non-informative prior), but unless effect sizes of the usage priming mechanism 
are taken to be exceptionally small, the analysis always favoured the salience model. 
A related issue is whether an independent usage mechanism exists but cannot be 
primed. This would be a mechanism that was affected by factors other than the salience of 
the alternative, but would not be sensitive to recent activity. Clearly, such a mechanism 
would not be observable with the paradigm used here. While we cannot eliminate this 
explanation, a large range of linguistic representations and processes have been 
successfully primed using similar paradigms (e.g., active versus passive forms, Bencini & 
Valian, 2008; transitive and dative syntactic forms, Bock 1986; animacy assignments, 
Bock, Loebell, & Morey, 1992; conceptual level structures for configurations in a maze, 
Garrod & Anderson, 1987; scopal interpretations with “every”, Raffray & Pickering, 2010; 
semantic coercion, Raffray, Pickering, Cai, & Branigan, 2013) and a non-primeable usage 
mechanism would be noteworthy for this reason alone. Furthermore, research on priming 
often has the tacit assumption that if the representation or mechanism of interest cannot 
be primed, no such representation exists (Branigan & Pickering, 2017; Pickering & 
Ferreira, 2008). For example, Raffray et al. (2013) suggest that a failure to find priming of 
noncompositional semantic-to-syntactic mappings would mean that there was no 
difference between compositional and noncompositional mappings. The difference 
between our study and those of other researchers is that we have drawn conclusions from 
negative observations rather than positive observations, but the logic of our study is 
identical. Finally, the priming effects shown in this study exclude the possibility that scalar 
implicature mechanisms in general are impervious to priming; the usage mechanism in 
particular would have to be non-primeable.  
Priming scalar implicatures 
We observed substantial priming of scalar implicatures. When the target trials were 
preceded by either the strong or the alternative prime trials, there were more implicatures 
relative to when the target was preceded by a weak prime. Whilst it is clear that scalar 
implicatures were primed, there are several potential explanations for why. 
The first is that strong and alternative primes raised activation levels of the 
alternatives during target trials, whereas weak primes did not. Consequently more 
alternatives exceeded the threshold in the strong and alternative conditions, thereby 
resulting in more implicatures. This is the account we presented in the Introduction. The 
second is that participants were primed to view the context as one in which informativity, 
or precision, was important. Implicature derivation requires individuals to be sensitive to 
informativity. The listener must be aware that a speaker could have been more 
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informative, i.e. could have used a stronger expression, and that the speaker was aware 
that they were less informative than they could have been. Accordingly the prime trials 
may have altered participants’ assumptions about acceptable levels of informativity 
(precision). The strong prime could have generated a context in which an informative, or 
precise, interpretation was expected. In target trials the expectation of informativity is 
best satisfied by the “Better Picture” option. Conversely the weak prime generated a loose, 
or “good enough” context. Consequently, in target trials, participants could have believed 
the weak image was good enough after the weak prime, since this satisfied the contextual 
demands. Alternative primes might also generate a precise context because the sentence 
was maximally informative, thus encouraging a more precise response to the subsequent 
target. 
We cannot distinguish the two explanations from the data but the local priming 
effects we observed argue against the informativity account. We used a within-subject 
design in which the primes varied within the same experimental context. The individual 
participant analysis confirmed that participants switched between strong and weak 
interpretations of the same expression. Alternatives might be expected to vary in 
activation across short time intervals (i.e. locally) because linguistic contexts can change 
rapidly in dialogue (the same alternative might be active in one context but not in another 
a few seconds later). In contrast, precision is more likely to be a property of a global 
context, such as the style of individual speakers (e.g. X speaks precisely, Y does not), 
individual listeners (e.g. children might be tolerant of imprecision, and so are less likely to 
derive an implicature, relative to adults, as in Katsos & Bishop, 2011), or situational 
factors (e.g. one should be precise when describing experiments in reports, but loose is 
fine when texting).  
A further explanation is that the priming effect was driven entirely by priming of the 
weak interpretation. Perhaps participants derived the strong interpretation by default, 
and were then reminded of the weak interpretation following the weak prime. There are 
two arguments against this explanation, however. The first is that responses were biased 
towards the weak interpretation, if anything, not towards the strong interpretation. This is 
particularly clear for the ad hoc expressions. Here, the overall proportion of strong 
responses was 0.15 in Experiment 1 and 0.08 in Experiment 2. If the default were indeed 
the strong interpretation, we would have expected much higher proportions of strong 
interpretations overall. The second is that participants repeatedly switched between 
strong and weak interpretations of the target within the task, as illustrated by the 
individual participants analysis. This means that strong and alternative primes must have 
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shifted responses from weak to strong, at some point, rather than from strong to weak 
only. Participants responded weak after weak primes, and then strong after 
alternative/strong primes, then returned to weak after weak primes etc. The weak prime 
hypothesis could not explain the effect of switching from a weak response to a strong 
response.  
The explanations above do not challenge the salience account. Whether activation, 
informativity, or default implicatures are the root cause of the priming effect, none require 
an independent usage mechanism. The final possibility we consider however, is a dual 
explanation model, which uses alternative activation and a usage mechanism. 
Consequently it supports a combination model. The dual explanation account proposes 
that the priming effect in the strong condition was caused by a combination of primed 
usage mechanism and primed alternatives, whereas that in the alternative condition was 
caused solely by the primed alternatives. The reason why the effect was the same size 
across conditions is that the alternative priming effect was greater in the alternative 
condition than the strong condition, which was then offset by priming of the usage 
mechanism. We argue against the dual explanation account, however, for the following 
reasons. First, it is more complex than the salience account but explains no more data. The 
dual account requires one set of factors to explain the alternative priming effect and 
another to explain the strong priming effect, and that these produce the same sized effects 
(in three expression types). In contrast, the salience account proposes one set of factors 
that explains both sets of effects, and the reason the effects are the same size is that they 
have the same underlying cause.  
Second, the combination account assumes that the alternative priming effect is 
smaller in the strong condition than the alternative condition, and we see no reason for 
this assumption to be true. Note that the reason cannot be that the alternative was 
considered more often in the alternative condition because participants must have 
generated the alternative in the strong prime trials to select the correct response (and we 
omitted trials in which this did not happen). Thus the alternative must have been more 
active in the alternative condition, over and above that which caused the implicature to be 
triggered. One potential reason is that participants read the alternative in the alternative 
condition but derived it themselves in the strong condition. Perhaps comprehension is a 
more effective prime than production. But there is no evidence that comprehension-to-
production priming (as in the alternative condition) is more effective than production-to-
production priming (as in the strong condition). Certainly, structural priming studies 
demonstrate that comprehension to production priming exists (e.g. Branigan, Cleland and 
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Pickering, 2000), but there are many production-to-production priming studies showing 
extremely large effects (e.g., Pickering & Branigan, 1998; see Pickering & Ferreira, 2008, 
for a review) and it is difficult to see why using comprehension procedures should prime 
production procedures more than production procedures themselves. A similar argument 
can be made from the education literature. Researchers have shown that re-reading text 
(comprehension) is not as effective a learning aid as self-generating answers (production; 
e.g., Dunlosky et al. 2013). One reason for this could be that production makes the 
information more salient than comprehension, contrary to the dual explanation account 
assumptions. 
The dual explanation account of our findings is logically possible but we do not find 
any reason to reject the more parsimonious salience explanation. We found no difference 
between conditions using three expressions and we feel that the onus is now on 
proponents of the combination model to find positive evidence of an independent usage 
mechanism. 
Alternatives in scalar implicatures 
Our findings help to clarify and extend previous work on alternatives in scalar 
implicatures. Skordos and Papafragou (2016) found that when children were exposed to 
relevant alternatives, the rate of implicatures increased, but not when they were exposed 
to the same alternatives but in an irrelevant context. Our data suggests the salience model 
provides the best explanation for these findings. In the relevant condition of Skordos and 
Papafragou, it was necessary to process the quantifiers deeply in the training block to 
correctly match the picture to the sentence. Activation levels of the quantifiers were 
consequently high. Conversely, in the irrelevant condition, processing could be much more 
shallow, and quantifier activation levels were consequently low. In the subsequent testing 
block, high activation levels of the alternatives in the relevant condition translated into 
high rates of implicature. While this does not conflict with Skordos and Papafragou’s claim 
that the deficit in children’s processing lies in their understanding of relevance (as 
compared to a deficit in lexical retrieval of the alterative), it shifts the locus of the 
explanation away from how alternatives are used by children towards how activation 
levels are computed, and how this might differ between adults and children. 
Our study also extends Skordos and Papafragou (2016) by demonstrating that 
alternative activation is a determiner of scalar implicatures in numbers and ad hoc scales, 
not just some. This is important because it suggests that the process by which strong and 
weak meanings are related in numbers and ad hoc implicatures is the same as in some. 
While some is the prototypical scalar implicature, there is some controversy about 
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whether the strong number meaning (exactly N) is derived from a lexically specified weak 
number meaning (at least N), as in standard scalar implicatures (e.g., Horn, 1972; 1989), 
or whether the weak meaning is derived from a lexically specified strong meaning (e.g., 
Breheny, 2008, Geurts, 2006; and see Huang, Spelke & Snedeker, 2013, for psychological 
evidence). Since strong interpretations can be primed in similar ways for numbers and 
some, the most straightforward conclusion is that the derivation and representation 
processes are also similar.  
This is not to say that there were no differences between the different expressions in 
our task. While priming effects were similar across expressions, ad hoc expressions had a 
much lower rate of implicature than some or the numbers. One explanation is that the 
alternative for ad hoc expressions was more difficult to derive than the alternative for the 
other expressions (see Bott & Chemla, 2016, for a similar point). For ad hoc expressions, 
the alternative required adding material to the sentence (e.g. the alternative to “There is 
an A,” was, “There is an A and a D”) whereas for some and the numbers, the alternatives 
involved replacing an element of the sentence with another element (e.g. the alternative to 
“Some of the letters are As” was “All of the letters are As”). Expansion could be more 
complex for the language processor than replacement. This mirrors Katzir (2007), who 
argues that there is a fundamental difference between alternatives formed from 
replacement and those formed by the addition of material. 
There are some problems with this explanation, however. One is that in the 
alternative prime condition, participants were presented with the alternative structure 
immediately prior to the target. The difficulty involved in generating an alternative for the 
ad hoc expressions must have been minimal in this condition, yet differences across 
expressions were large. Another is that the developmental data isn’t consistent with the 
claim that ad hoc alternatives are more difficult to derive than some alternatives (all). 
Barner, Bale and Brooks (2010) showed that while 4 year old children had difficulty 
retrieving the alternative for some (as did Skordos & Papafragou, 2016), they easily 
constructed the alternative for context dependent conditions, which were similar to the ad 
hoc expressions used here. If the alternative for some is easy to derive, one might expect it 
to be acquired early. Consequently, it might be that complexity plays no part in the 
construction of alternatives after all, and instead, the ad hoc alternatives are less salient 
for some more general contextual reason.  
Another possibility is that the difference in rate of implicatures across expressions is 
due to differences in the baseline activation of an independent usage mechanism. 
Participants might have had less experience with generating ad hoc implicatures than 
Role of the Alternative 
46 
 
quantifiers and numbers, which in turn would lower the baseline activation for the usage 
mechanism in these cases. We cannot rule this explanation out completely but we make 
two arguments against it. First, this explanation requires a separate usage mechanism for 
each expression (a separate usage mechanism for ad hoc implicatures, quantifiers, and 
numerals). Accounting for the difference in implicature rates on the basis of the salience of 
the alternatives requires only a single usage mechanism for all three expressions. The 
salience explanation is therefore more parsimonious. Second, if the different usage 
mechanisms obtain different levels of baseline activation through experience, it is not 
clear why they could not be primed in our experiment. Developmental priming of 
structures is generally assumed to operate using the same mechanism as short term 
priming (Pickering & Ferreira, 2008) and in which case, a structure that is susceptible to 
developmental priming should also exhibit short term priming.  
Our results also bear on the interpretation of Bott and Chemla (2016). Recall that 
Bott and Chemla observed priming of implicatures within the same expression (e.g. from 
some to some), just as we did. However, they also found that different sorts of implicatures 
primed each other (e.g., some primed numbers). They suggested that this effect could be 
explained in two ways. The first assumes that a usage mechanism was primed. The strong 
prime trials elevated the activation of the usage mechanism so that when reading the 
ambiguous target trials, participants were more likely to use the alternative, i.e. combine it 
with the literal meaning. This explanation is consistent with a combination account, in 
which alternative salience and alternative usage make different contributions to the rate 
at which people derive implicatures. The second was that an alternative search 
mechanism was primed. In the former, a mechanism could be triggered to search for 
alternatives so that the mechanism was more active after a strong prime trial than a weak 
prime trial, regardless of whether the expressions were of the same type. This explanation 
is compatible with the salience model. Since we found no evidence for the primeable usage 
mechanism, our data suggest that the search mechanism was the more likely explanation 
for Bott and Chemla’s between expression priming results.  
Finally, Katsos and Bishop (2011) found that in some contexts, children were aware 
of alternatives but chose not to derive the implicature (they were more “tolerant” of 
underinformative sentences than adults). This finding is difficult to reconcile with our 
conclusion: If there is no independent usage mechanism, how can people be aware of the 
alternative but not derive an implicature? We are not confident of the answer but we 
suggest the difference might lie in a cancellation mechanism. While scalar implicatures 
might always be derived given sufficient salience of the alternative, there might be a 
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cancellation mechanism that applies after the fact, as in traditional defeasement. It might 
be this mechanism that differs across adults and children, not the initial derivation of the 
implicature. 
Scalar implicatures and representations 
Scalar implicatures are typically described in terms of mechanisms, such as deriving 
the alternatives and adherence to maxims, in keeping with pragmatics tradition, whereas 
structural priming researchers refer to representations, in keeping with syntax and 
semantics. However, Bott and Chemla (2016; see also Rees & Bott, 2017) suggest that 
implicatures could also be seen as meaning-based representations that can be primed 
(similar to Raffray and Pickering’s (2010) account of scopal ambiguity priming). They note 
that the processor could access a representation for scalar implicature, [S + not(Alt(S))], 
where S corresponds to the sentence and Alt a more informative sentence (an alternative), 
and that this representation could be linked to trigger expressions such as some. Both the 
link between the trigger expression and the representation itself could be primed, much 
like the representations and links assumed in the structural priming literature (e.g. 
between verbs, such as give, and syntactic frames, such as double object constructions, see 
Pickering & Branigan, 1998). We agree that it is useful to consider implications in this way 
but our results argue against the equivalence of the representations proposed in the 
structural priming literature and an [S + not(Alt(S))] implicature representation, as we 
describe below. 
That there are meaning-based representations associated with scalar implicatures is 
indisputable. Since implicatures are part of what is communicated, implicatures must be 
represented by the listener. However, our results demonstrate that this representation is 
not independent from the material that gave rise to it, in the sense proposed by 
researchers in the structural priming literature. It is not a static, pre-existing frame that is 
waiting to be filled by appropriate content, as it is in a syntactic frame. Two aspects of our 
finding give rise to this conclusion. First, if there were such a representation, we should 
have been able to prime it. We used the same method that has been used to discover 
independent representations in the structural priming literature yet we saw no evidence 
of a primeable implicature representation. Second, we found that alternatives primed 
scalar implicatures. Although this does not conflict with the existence of an [S + 
not(Alt(S))] representation, there is no evidence that structural priming representations, 
such as syntactic frames, are influenced by an alternative (indeed, syntactic frames do not 
have alternatives in the same way that utterances do). Overall, our work suggests that 
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implicature representations are quite different to those proposed in the structural priming 
literature (c.f. Rees & Bott, 2017). 
Default scalar implicatures and salience 
The salience account is similar in many respects to the Neo-Gricean, default model 
(e.g., Levinson, 2000; Horn, 1972). In both cases, the implicature is obligatorily derived 
(i.e., by default) providing the alternative is salient. How then, does the salience account 
explain the processing cost associated with scalar implicatures, as observed by Bott and 
Noveck (2004) and others (e.g., Breheny, Katsos & Williams, 2006; Huang & Snedeker, 
2009)? The default model, as expressed by Bott and Noveck, stated that the implicatures 
are always derived, but that they can sometimes be cancelled. Thus there is no explanation 
for why the weak interpretation of a sentence can ever be faster to understand than the 
strong interpretation, as per their results. Under the salience account, however, the strong 
interpretation will only arise if the alternative is sufficiently salient. If the context does not 
sufficiently raise the salience of the alternative, the strong interpretation will not arise. 
Thus, in the literal conditions of Bott and Noveck, the argument would be that the 
alternatives were not sufficiently salient, and so no implicature was derived. Conversely, 
in the implicature conditions, the alternative was made salient, and so the alternatives 
were negated, incorporated into the sentence etc., with the accompanying processing cost. 
Politzer-Ahles and Gwilliams (2015) and Degen and Tanenhaus (2015) make similar 
arguments. Of course, this is only a hypothesis, and we look forward to further work 
testing whether processing costs associated with scalar implicatures are reduced when 
alternatives are salient.  
Summary 
The aim of these studies was to investigate the role that alternatives play in the 
derivation of implicatures. Previous work has focussed on how the alternatives are used, 
whereas here we focussed on the role played by salience. Our study makes two important 
contributions. (1) We demonstrate that adults are sensitive to the salience of alternatives 
when deriving scalar implicatures. This is a local effect, not dependent on using different 
speakers or contexts to vary salience, and applies across a wide range of purported scalar 
implicatures. (2) We find no evidence of a usage mechanism that applies independently of 
the salience of the alternative. We thus suggest that the rate of scalar implicature is 
determined entirely by the salience of the alternative. 
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Chapter 3: Deriving Ad Hoc implicatures. 
Scalar implicatures arise when a speaker uses a less than maximally informative 
term. Consider the example “Betty passed some of the exams”. Since the speaker did not 
say that “Betty passed all of the exams” the implicature that Betty passed some but not all 
of the exams arises. This is considered scalar because the quantifiers some and all form a 
lexical scale <some, all>, which is ordered on informativity, where all is the 
informationally stronger alternative to some. In Chapter 2 we saw that raising the salience 
of the alternative aids the derivation of scalar implicatures. Adults were primed to derive a 
scalar implicature and when the alternative was the prime derivation occurred at a similar 
rate as when the scalar implicature was the prime. This pattern is seen in different 
categories of enrichment and suggests that providing the alternative is sufficiently salient 
an implicature will be derived. These effects were seen in metalinguistic interpretation 
judgements which occur at the end of processing. Consequently these results cannot tell us 
about the online linguistic processing of implicatures or how priming may affect 
processing. 
The experiments presented in this chapter focus on one particular type of 
enrichment, ad hoc enrichments. Ad hoc enrichments differ from prototypical scalar 
implicatures because they are contextually based and thus do not have a clearly defined 
set of alternatives in the same way that quantifiers do. Nevertheless, similar priming 
effects have been seen previously in ad hoc enrichments. Thus the aims of the experiments 
presented in the chapter are twofold. First we want to investigate how priming influences 
the processing of implicatures, if indeed it does. Secondly we test two explanations for 
how ad hoc enrichments are derived. 
Ad hoc implicatures 
Not all implicatures that arise are based on lexicalised scales. Many expressions can 
be enriched from contextually based alternatives; the enrichment occurs on an ad hoc 
basis. Take the following: 
(1) A: I hear Helen’s husband is rich and intelligent. 
B: Well, he’s rich.  
=>He’s not intelligent. 
(2) A: Are Mary and John coming to the party? 
B: John is. 
=>Mary is not coming. 
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(3) A: Where are the cakes? 
B: Charlie ate some of them. 
=>Charlie ate some but not all of the cakes. 
In these examples B’s replies imply that (1) Helen’s husband is not intelligent and (2) 
Mary is not coming to the party. There are no established scales that would allow for these 
implicatures to be derived. The implication in (1) depends on A’s previous statement 
about him being rich and intelligent. If instead A had said that Helen’s husband was rich 
and handsome B’s response would have given rise to a different implicature, not 
handsome. This is in contrast to (3), if instead of cakes Charlie ate some of the cookies, the 
same implicature (that he ate some but not all) would arise.  
Some authors suggest that ad hoc implicatures can be derived in the same way as 
implicatures arising from quantifiers or numerals (e.g. Bott & Chemla, 2016; Hirschberg, 
1991). The alternatives for ad hoc implicatures are contextually based rather than 
lexicalised (e.g. Hirschberg, 1991; Stiller, Goodman, & Frank, 2014) but an ad hoc scale can 
be constructed e.g. <rich/intelligent, rich & intelligent>, <Mary/John, Mary & John>. The 
stronger element in the scale can then be negated, e.g. not (rich & intelligent), just as in 
quantifier implicatures, e.g. not (all). Linguistic support for the claim that ad hoc 
implicatures are derived in the same way as quantifier implicatures comes from the 
observation that they behave similarly in different linguistic environments, such as 
defeasement, e.g. (4), embedding in the antecedent of the condition, e.g. (5), and negation 
(6). 
(4) John’s coming. But that’s not to say that Mary isn’t; I just don’t know.  
=/=> Mary is not coming to the party. 
(5)  If John’s coming, then I’m not! 
=/=> Mary is not coming to the party. 
(6) John’s not coming. 
=> Mary is coming. 
Support for this also comes from a number of experimental results. The experiments  
in Chapter 2 found that there was no difference in rates of implicature derivation 
following the alternative prime trial or the strong (implicature) prime trial for quantifier, 
numeral, or ad hoc implicatures (although the rates of enrichment overall were 
significantly lower for ad hoc implicatures). Similarly, Bott & Chemla (2016) found that ad 
hoc implicatures primed quantifier and number implicatures, suggesting overlapping 
methods of derivation. 
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Although ad hoc implicatures appear to share many of the same characteristics as 
quantifier and numeral enrichments there are some interesting differences too. First, the 
developmental trajectory seems to be different. Children often have difficulty generating 
quantifer implicatures (e.g. Huang & Snedeker, 2009; Noveck, 2001; Papafragou & 
Musolino, 2003), in part due to their difficulty in generating appropriate alternatives 
(Barner, Brooks, & Bale, 2011; Chierchia, Crain, Guasti, Gualmini, & Meroni; 2001; 
Gualmini et al, 2001).  Children seem unaware that their knowledge of scalar terms (e.g. 
all) is relevant when interpreting other scalar terms (e.g. some). In contrast, they seem to 
have no difficultly deriving ad hoc implicatures (Stiller, Goodman, & Frank, 2014), or 
number implicatures (Papafragou & Musolino, 2003). For example, Stiller et al used a 
referent selection task where they presented children with three characters and a label 
such as “My friend has glasses”. One of the characters wore glasses and another wore 
glasses and a hat. They found that children selected the character with the single item 
(glasses) more often than the other characters suggesting that the children had made the 
implicature that “My friend has glasses but no hat,” just as adults do. 
Second, there is some evidence that ad hoc implicatures and quantifier implicatures 
are processed differently. The most direct comes from van Tiel and Schaeken (2016), who 
tested whether exhaustivity in it-clefts are processed in the same way as quantifier 
implicatures (and other sorts of enrichments). Exhaustivity in it-clefts is exemplified in 
(7).  
(7) It was Mary who ate a pizza. 
=> Nobody other than Mary ate pizza. 
Here, the cleft, “It was…” emphasises that it was only Mary that ate the pizza. Whilst some 
argue the clefts semantically force the exhaustivity (much like only) (Atlas & Levinson, 
1981; Büring & Križ, 2013; Bolinger, 1972; Hedberg, 2000; Percus, 1997; Velleman et al, 
2012), there is growing support for an implicature-based explanation (Drenhaus, 
Zimmermann, & Vasisth, 2011; Destruel & Farmer, 2015; DeVeaugh-Geiss, Zimmermann, 
Onea, & Boell, 2015; van Tiel & Schaeken, 2016), involving the construction of alternatives. 
If it-clefts are implicature based, the exclusivity in it-clefts should incur a processing cost 
similar to that seen for scalar implicatures (e.g. Bott & Noveck, 2004; Degen & Tanenhaus, 
2011; Tomlinson, Bailey, & Bott, 2013; but see also Grodner, Klein, Carbary, & Tanenhaus, 
2010). However, if exclusivity is reached without recourse to the alternatives then there 
should be no processing cost associated with exclusivity in it-clefts. van Tiel and Schaeken 
(2016) found that deriving a scalar implicature incurred a processing cost whereas 
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exclusivity in it-clefts did not. This would suggest that exhaustivity in it-clefts arises 
without consultation of possible alternatives. 
Finally, there is a computational problem associated with deriving ad hoc 
implicatures in the same way as quantifier implicatures (see Geurts, 2010). Since ad hoc 
implicatures do not have a predefined lexicalised scale of alternatives in the same way as 
prototypical scalar quantifier implicatures do, there are theoretically an indefinite number 
of alternatives to be considered. Take the following example (from Geurts, 2010): 
(8) A: What did you have for lunch? 
B: I had some strawberries. 
While B’s reply would give rise to the implicature that she did not eat all of the 
strawberries it is also likely to also imply that she only ate strawberries. If A were deriving 
an implicature by considering the set of possible alternatives, she would have to negate an 
indefinite number of alternatives, such as, “I had some strawberries and a biscuit”, “I had 
some strawberries, a biscuit, and a sandwich.” It is not clear how the language processor 
could deal with this potentially infinite set. 
Ad hoc implicatures without specific alternatives 
The foregoing discussion presented the argument that ad hoc implicatures are 
derived by considering alternatives to what the speaker said, in much the same way as 
alternatives are used in quantifier implicatures. But we also noted important differences 
between the two phenomena. If ad hoc implicatures are derived in the same way as 
quantifier implicatures, why are there different developmental trajectories and processing 
signatures? Furthermore, how does the processer solve the problem of infinite 
alternatives? One way of reconciling these findings is to argue that ad hoc implicatures 
involve consideration of alternatives but not those of the same sort as quantifier 
implicatures. Thus there is partial overlap, but not complete overlap, with quantifier 
implicatures. In particular, ad hoc alternatives might require consideration of general 
alternatives, but not specific alternatives. Consider (1) again below 
(1) A: I hear Helen’s husband is rich and intelligent. 
 B: Well, he’s rich.  
Following the standard Gricean approach, the inference in (1) would be He’s rich but 
not intelligent. However the implicature may instead be a type of exhaustive inference, 
He’s rich but nothing else (Geurts, 2010). Following this logic the inference in (8) could be I 
had strawberries and nothing else. Exhaustive inferences could be derived by considering a 
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general alternative, e.g. could the speaker have said anything else to be more informative?, 
rather than specific alternatives, e.g. why didn’t the speaker say rich and intelligent? Or why 
didn’t the speaker say strawberries and a biscuit? This would avoid the need to consider an 
infinite number of alternatives since the only alternative needed would be a general 
anything else alternative. It would also differ from quantifier implicatures where the 
speaker makes a specific implication e.g. some but not all.  
To address the question of how ad hoc implicatures are derived we present three 
experiments focusing on implicature processing. The first experiment looks at reaction 
times and the final two use the visual world paradigm. The main aim was to identify 
whether ad hoc implicatures are derived using exhaustive inferences (the exhaustive 
account) or a specific alternatives-based approach (the specific account), such as the 
standard account of quantity implicatures.  
Experiment 1 
The experiments in Chapter 2 investigated the role the alternative plays in the 
derivation of scalar implicatures. Participants derived implicatures at equivalent rates 
when the alternative was made salient and when they derived an implicature in the 
previous trial. This would suggest that ad hoc implicatures are derived by using specific 
alternatives, contrary to the exhaustive account discussed above. However there are 
several points to keep in mind with regards to the results of Chapter 2. Firstly, the 
proportion of ad hoc implicatures derived was significantly lower than for quantifiers and 
numerals. Thus the behaviour of the ad hoc implicatures was different to those of the 
quantifiers. The reason could be that the underlying derivation process is also different. 
Secondly, the task of asking participants for a “better picture” might obscure some of the 
derivation process. In prime trials participants were asked to decide which picture 
matched the sentence. In target trials participants were presented with one picture and 
then the option to choose a different picture if they thought there was a picture which 
would match the sentence better. This is odd because it is a different task from the prime 
trials; participants do not necessarily have to derive an implicature, they only have to 
decide that the picture they are provided with is not appropriate. Finally, the conclusions 
of Chapter 2 were based on interpretation judgements. Conclusions might be different 
when considering processing information.  
In Experiment 1 we adapted the priming paradigm from Chapter 2 for processing. 
There were three primes (strong, weak, and alternative) and two targets (strong and 
weak). Target trials did not include a “better picture” option and consequently they were 
indistinguishable from the prime trials. According to the specific account, ad hoc 
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implicature derivation requires the use of specific alternatives. If this is the case, 
alternative prime trials should prime implicature derivation in the strong target trials to a 
similar rate as following strong primes because alternative primes provide participants 
with the specific alternative structure. This would be reflected in similar reaction times 
following strong and alternative primes. Reaction times to strong targets following strong 
and alternative primes would be faster than following weak primes (Noppeney & Price, 
2004; Smith & Wheeldon, 2001; Wheeldon & Smith, 2003) and the opposite pattern would 
be expected for weak targets. 
According to the exhaustive account however, specific alternatives are not involved 
in ad hoc implicature generation. Consequently alternative primes should not prime 
implicature derivation. Thus we would expect no difference in reaction times following 
alternative and weak primes; responses to strong targets should be fastest following 
strong primes and responses to weak targets should be slowest following strong primes. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-five Cardiff University undergraduate students participated for course credit. 
All participants were native English speakers. 
Design & Materials 
 Each trial consisted of a sentence presented above two pictures. Participants had 
to match the sentence to one of the pictures.  
There were two possible sentence frames for prime trials: “There is a [letter]” for 
strong and weak primes and “There is a [letter] and a [letter]” for alternative prime trials. 
Pictures contained either one or two letters (Figure 1). These pictures could be strong, 
weak, or false depending on the sentence predicate.  Strong pictures contained a single 
letter. Weak and false pictures contained two letters. The letter in the strong picture was 
the same as the predicate. Weak pictures contained one letter that was the same as the 
predicate and one that was different. Both of the letters in false pictures were different 
from the predicate. There were three types of prime: strong, weak and alternative. Strong 
primes involved a strong and a weak picture, and weak prime trials involved a weak and a 
false picture. Alternative primes had the same picture configuration as strong primes, but 
due to the different sentence frame used, alternative primes had a weak and a false 
picture. Target trials were the same as strong and weak prime trials. For weak trials the 
correct response was to select the picture with the letter that matched the predicate. For 
strong trials the correct response was the picture with the single letter, which matched the 
predicate. 
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Figure 1. Example trials. 
There were three types of prime trial (strong, weak, alternative) and two types of 
target trial (strong, weak).  Thus there were 3 (prime) x 2 (target) = 6 distinct prime-
target trial combinations. 
For each combination there were 12 examples, this resulted in 12 (examples) x 6 
(combinations) x 2 (pairs) = 144 experimental trials. An additional 36 alternative-target 
pairs were included along with 72 filler items. The alternative-target 
pairs consisted either a strong, weak, or alternative trial followed by 
an alternative trial. Figure 2 shows a filler item. This ensured that 
each type of trial was seen an equal number of times and prevented 
participants developing a response bias to mixed and complete 
displays. The inclusion of filler trials equalised the number of full set 
and partial set picture selections. Experimental and filler items were 
presented randomly. Sixteen practice trials were included at the 
beginning of the experiment, participants were unaware of the practice trials. The practice 
trials were not obviously different from the rest of the experiment. 
Procedure 
The Experiment was run using Psychtoolbox-3 on MATLAB 2013b. Participants 
were told they would “be presented with a sentence and two pictures. The task is to select 
the picture which best matches the sentence shown.” 
In a trial an image pair and a sentence would be shown to a participant (Figure 3). 
The participant had to select which picture they felt best matched the sentence and 
respond using a key press. The pictures would stay onscreen until participants made a 
response. There was a 500ms interval between the presentation of items. 
Figure 2. Example filler trial. 
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Figure 3. Example prime target sequence. 
Results 
A total of 3240 responses were made. Responses were not included in the analyses if 
the target trial was incorrect, if the previous prime trial was incorrect or if the response 
time was not between 0.3 – 3 seconds, this accounted for 11.7% of the data. The reaction 
times to the remaining trials were logged and analysed. A 3 x 2 ANOVA was run on the 
data with prime type (alternative, strong, weak) and target type (strong, weak) as within 
participant factors. There was no effect of prime (F (2, 88) = 2.62, p = .078, BF = .255) or 
target (F (1, 44) = 1.47, p = .232, BF = .311). There was a significant interaction between 
prime type and target type (F (2, 88) = 22.75, p < .001).  
 
Figure 4. Reaction time in seconds to each target type following each prime trial. Error bars show 
standard error. 
The effect of prime was significant for strong targets (F(2, 88) = 6.61, p = .002). 
Response times to strong targets were significantly affected by prime types. Responses 
were significantly slower to strong targets following weak and alternative primes 
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compared with strong primes (t(44) = 2.51, p = .016; t(44) = 3.56, p = .001). There was no 
significant difference between responses following weak and alternative primes (t(44) = -
.80, p = .428, BF = 0.218). 
The effect of prime was significant for weak targets (F(2, 88) = 17.82, p < .001). 
Response times to weak targets were significantly affected by prime types. Responses 
were significantly faster following alternative and weak primes compared to strong 
primes (t(44) = 3.92, p < .001; t(44) = 6.15, p <. 001). There was no significant difference 
between response times following alternative and weak primes (t(44) = -1.66, p = .103, BF 
= .577). 
It is possible that switching between tasks would affect response times 
independently of our manipulation. Thus we compared reaction times to “congruent” 
trials and “incongruent” trials. We pooled responses from “strong-weak” and “weak-
strong” combinations to create “congruent” trials. We pooled responses from “strong-
strong” and “weak-weak” trial combinations to create “incongruent” trials. We did not 
include alternative trials in this analysis because of the added complication of a different 
sentence frame; strong and weak trials used the same sentence frame, only the 
interpretation of the sentence differed. There was a significant difference in response 
times between congruent and incongruent trials (t(44)=5.66, p<.001). Participants were 
faster when the task was congruent than incongruent. 
 
Figure 5. Reaction time in seconds for congruent and incongruent tasks. 
Discussion 
Participants responded fastest to strong targets following strong primes; there was 
no difference in response times following alternative or weak primes. This was borne out 
in the Bayesian analysis. The results suggest that the derivation of ad hoc implicatures 
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does not involve the alternative since there was no difference in speed of implicature 
derivation following alternative and weak primes. Only deriving the implicature in the 
previous trial facilitated subsequent implicature derivation. Thus ad hoc implicatures 
appear to be a type of exhaustivity inference. 
Reaction times are a more sensitive measure of processing than interpretation 
judgements but they are still based on sentence final judgements. They consequently 
provide limited information about the mid-sentence processing effects. .We therefore turn 
to an even more fine-grained measure of processing, visual world eyetracking (e.g. Arai, 
van Gompel, & Scheepers, 2007; Eberhard, Spivey-Knowlton, Sedivy, & Tanenhaus, 1995; 
Traxler & Tooley, 2008). 
Experiment 2 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to test whether implicature priming could be observed 
using a visual world paradigm. Because there have been no previous demonstrations of 
implicature priming using visual world eyetracking we wanted to be sure that priming 
was observable with this method. In Experiment 3 we return to the more specific question 
about exhaustive vs specific ad hoc processing.  
Participants were presented with a set of four cards and heard a description. The 
task was for the participant to identify the card being described. In all trials the cards 
followed the structure shown in Figure 6 and all descriptions took the form “The card with 
the [object]”.  
Experimental items involved prime->target pairs. Prime trials could refer to either 
the A card (e.g. the pencil) or the AB card (e.g. the book and 
the pencil). In these cards the A object was duplicated (the 
pencil in Fig. 6) and consequently descriptions of the A 
card (“The card with the [A]”) were ambiguous between 
the A and AB card. In the Figure 6 the A card description 
was “The card with the pencil.” Since there is a pencil in 
both the A and AB card this description is ambiguous; it is 
not clear which card is being described. In order for 
listeners to correctly identify the card being described they 
were required to make an inference, thus the A card trials were implicature trials. 
Descriptions of the AB card were not ambiguous because they referred to the unique item 
(“The card with the [B]”). In Figure 6 the AB card description was “The card with the 
book.” Since there is only one card containing a book this description is unambiguous, thus 
Figure 6. Example item with card 
labels. 
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the AB card trials were no-implicature trials. The target trials always referred to the A 
card.  
In order to identify the correct card in target trials participants were required to 
make an inference. It was predicted that participants would be faster to identify the 
correct card following primes where they had derived an implicature (A primes) than 
following primes where no implicature was derived (AB primes). Thus we expect more 
looks to the target card at an earlier time point following implicature primes than no 
implicature primes. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-two participants were recruited from the Cardiff University population. Five 
participants were excluded for having fewer than 75% valid trials. 
Design & Materials 
Experimental items referred to the A and AB cards. Prime trials referred to either 
the A or the AB card and target trials always referred to the A card. The A cards were 
implicature trials and AB cards were no implicature trials. These were organised into 32 
prime->target pairs (16 AB primes and 16 A primes). Prime and target trials were 
indistinguishable from each other so the participants were no aware of the relation 
between the two trials. The card being described appeared in all four positions and equal 
number of times in prime trials and target trials. The correct card was in the same position 
in both prime and target for 25% of trials. Experimental items were counterbalanced so 
that in prime trials each set of four cards had an A description and an AB description. 
Target trials were the same. Items were counterbalanced so that participants heard either 
the A or the AB prime description. 
In the experimental items the A card was described 48 times whereas the AB card 
was only described 16 times. This was because A card trials were both prime and target 
trials whereas AB card trials were only primes. Consequently filler trials were included to 
prevent biasing participants to the A card. Filler trials referred to the AB, C, and DE cards. 
To ensure that each card type was selected an equal number of times there were 32 AB, 48 
C, and 48 DE cards. The correct card was rotated in each of the four positions to prevent 
participants becoming biased towards a particular position.  
At the start of the experiment there were 16 practice items (4 of each card type) to 
allow participants to get used to the experiment. These items were indistinguishable from 
the main experiment. Consequently there were 32 (prime x target pairs) + 128 fillers + 16 
practice items = 208 trials. Experimental pairs and filler items were presented randomly. 
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Audio descriptions were recorded by a female native British English speaker. She 
was given a script to read from and did not see the items. 
Procedure 
Participants were seated in front of a 23 inch colour 
monitor with an independent eye tracking system (Tobii 
TX300) running at 120 Hz sampling rate. Viewing was 
binocular and eye movements were recorded from both 
eyes simultaneously. Participants completed a 9 point 
calibration at the start of the experiment. 
The experiment was controlled using MATLAB 
2014a. Each trial began with a centrally located fixation cross presented for 2000msec 
before the trial was automatically initiated (see Figure 7). At this point the fixation cross 
was replaced by a set of four cards and after a 25ms delay the description was played. The 
picture stayed on screen, and eyes were tracked until participants made a selection. 
Data processing 
For analysis, any samples that were deemed invalid (e.g. due to blinks or head 
movement) were removed from the data. The spatial coordinates of the remaining 
samples were used to calculate the location of the eye-gaze. These samples were 
aggregated into packets of 25ms.  
For each packet the proportion of looks to the target card was calculated as a 
proportion of looks to all other areas. This was done by first scoring each sample (8ms) as 
looking to target or not, then totalling the samples looking to target and dividing by the 
total number of samples in the packet.  
Results  
The data were split into two sections: before referent and after referent. We 
analysed 250ms prior to referent onset, and each time bin from referent onset to 1 second 
after. Average referent offset was 475ms after onset. Figure 8 shows proportion of time 
looking to target in each 25ms bin from 250ms before referent onset to 1 second after 
referent onset. 
Figure 7. Example trial sequence 
Ad Hoc Implicatures 
  
61 
 
 
Figure 8. Proportion of time looking at target from -250 ms to 1 second from referent onset. 0ms is 
referent onset. The black line refers to looks following an implicature (A card) prime. The white line 
refers to looks following a no implicature prime (AB prime). 
Before referent 
A repeated measures ANOVA was run from 250ms before referent onset to 25ms 
before onset. Time and condition were included as within-participants factors. There was 
no effect of time or prime for participants (F1 (9, 324) = .69, p = .716; F1 (1, 36) = .001, p = 
.970) or items (F2 (9, 279) = 1.13, p = .342; F2 (1, 31) = .39, p = .535). There was a 
significant interaction between time and condition for both participants and items (F1 (9, 
324) = 2.328, p < .015; F2 (9, 279) = 2.50, p = .009). The interaction was examined further 
by comparing the prime at each time point individually. There was a significant difference 
between the primes at 200ms prior to referent onset for participants, with more looks to 
the target following no implicature primes (t1 (36) = 2.03, p = .05). There was also a 
significant difference between the conditions at 75ms prior to referent onset, with there 
being more looks to the target following implicature primes, for items (t2 (31) = 2.42, p = 
.022). There was no significant difference at any other time point prior to referent onset 
(t1’s (36) < 1.43, p’s > .116; t2’s (31) < 1.87, p’s > .072). 
After referent 
A repeated measures ANOVA was run from referent onset to 1 second after. Time 
and prime were included as between-participants factors. There was no main effect of 
prime for participants or items (F1 (1, 36) = .13, p = .726; F2 (1, 31) = .96, p = .336). There 
was a main effect of time for participants and items (F1 (40, 1440) = 15.11, p < .001; F2 (40, 
1240) = 13.62, p < .001). There was a significant interaction between time and prime for 
participants (F1 (40, 1440) = 1.51, p = .022) and items (F2 (40, 1240) = 1.62, p = .009). The 
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interaction was examined further by comparing the prime at each time point individually. 
There was a significant difference between the primes for both participants and items at 
625ms (t1 (36) = 2.23, p = .030; t2 (31) = 2.04, p = .050) and 675 ms after referent onset (t1 
(36) = 2.61, p = .013; t2 (31) = 2.96, p = .006). In each case there were more looks to the 
target following the implicature than the no implicature prime. At no other time points 
was there a significant difference between primes for participants. Table 1 below shows 
the other time points in which there was a significant difference between primes for items. 
Time (ms) df t2 p 
800 31 2.35 .026 
825 31 2.45 .020 
900 31 2.02 .052 
1000 31 2.26 .031 
Table 1. Significant t-test values by items. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 demonstrated facilitatory priming for implicature processing. 
Participants looked to the target card more often and quicker following prime trials that 
required an implicature. Thus participants are faster to derive an implicature after 
recently deriving one.  
Interestingly we found an interaction prior to the referent onset. In the 175ms 
preceding referent there are more looks to the target following an implicature prime. This 
may be accounted for through a visual priming explanation; after the implicature prime 
participants may be more drawn to the A card since this is the card that they previously 
selected. This pattern is switched during the articulation of the referent; participants look 
at the target more following a no implicature prime trial. What is happening here is 
unclear however, it could be a reflection of early prediction. 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 tested between two possible accounts of how ad hoc implicatures are 
derived. One, the specific account, includes the use of specific alternative sentences, just as 
in quantifier implicatures, and the other, the exhaustive account, does not. To test between 
these accounts we used a visual world paradigm, as in Experiment 2, but we changed the 
primes. In this experiment there were two types: (1) no implicature (weak) and (2) 
alternative. No implicature primes were the same as in Experiment 2; they referred to the 
AB card using a simple noun phrase. Alternative prime trials also referred to the AB cards 
but they used the alternative structure; instead of using a simple noun phrase a 
conjunction was used e.g. “The card with the book and the pencil.” Target trials referred to 
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the A cards and thus required participants to derive an implicature, just as in Experiment 
2. 
Chapter 2 showed that participants were equally likely to derive an implicature after 
previously making an implicature and if the alternative was made salient. Consequently, it 
is expected that if ad hoc implicature derivation involves the use of a specific alternative 
structure then this should prime the derivation of implicatures in the subsequent trial. 
Thus, following alternative primes participants should derive the implicature quicker. 
Therefore there should be more looks to the target card earlier following the alternative 
than the no alternative primes. However, if the specific alternative structure is not 
represented then there should be no difference in looks to the target following alternative 
and no implicature primes. 
If the specific alternative structure is used in deriving the implicature then 
repetition of this alternative is expected to boost any priming effect. In order to test this 
we also included a lexical overlap manipulation. In half of the trials the referent was 
repeated across prime and target trials. If the specific alternative is represented then 
lexical overlap between alternative primes and targets should boost priming (c.f. Cleland & 
Pickering, 2003; Pickering & Branigan, 1998; Pickering & Ferreira, 2006). Thus we expect 
more looks to the target, earlier when there is lexical overlap. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty participants were recruited from the Cardiff University population. 
Design & Materials 
Experimental items referred to the A and AB cards. A cards were always target trials 
and AB cards were always prime trials. The no-implicature primes were the same as the 
AB primes from Experiment 1. The alternative prime trials also described the AB card 
however the descriptions used a conjunction (“the card with the [A] and the [B]”). 
Experiment 2 demonstrated a priming effect following implicature primes relative to no 
implicature primes. Since Chapter 2 demonstrated equivalent priming from alternative 
and implicature primes we did not include implicature primes in this experiment. 
Items were organised into 64 prime->target pairs. Pairs could be overlap or no-
overlap. In overlap pairs the referent was repeated across the prime and target trials (a 
different picture was used). This meant that for no-implicature primes participants heard 
the same sentence in prime and target trials These trials were not analysed because they 
involved the use of the same audio file repeated with no intervening trials; the repetition 
of the audio file may have provided an early cue to participants about which card was the 
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target which was unrelated to the processing of an implicature. For alternative primes the 
[B] referent was repeated in the prime and target trials.  
This resulted in 4 conditions: alt overlap, alt no overlap, no implicature overlap, and 
no implicature no overlap. Experimental pairs were counterbalanced so that each pair 
appeared in each condition, this resulted in 4 separate lists. The position of the correct 
card was rotated across the four positions in both prime and target trials so that the 
correct card appeared in each position an equal number of times. The correct card was in 
the same position in both prime and target for 25% of trials.  Filler trials referred to the C 
and DE cards.  There were 64 DE fillers and 64 C fillers, 32 DE fillers had a referent overlap 
with the C fillers. 
At the start of the experiment there were 16 practice items (4 of each card type), 8 
of which had overlapping referents. These items were indistinguishable from the main 
experiment. Consequently there were 32 (prime x target pairs) + 128 fillers + 16 practice 
items = 208 trials. Experimental pairs and filler items were presented randomly. 
Audio descriptions were recorded by a female native British English speaker. She 
was given a script to read from and did not see the items. The procedure was the same as 
in Experiment 2 but the eye-tracker sampling rate was 300hz. 
Results 
Figure 9 shows the proportion of looks to the target card from 250 ms before 
referent onset to 1000ms after referent onset. Average referent offset was 534 ms after 
referent onset.  
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Figure 9. Proportion of looks to target from 250 ms before referent onset to 1000ms after onset. 0 ms 
is referent onset. 
If a specific alternative is involved in deriving ad hoc implicatures then participants 
should be more likely to look to targets following the alternative prime than following the 
no implicature prime. Consequently, we conducted pairwise comparisons between the two 
conditions from referent onset to 1 second after referent onset. There was no significant 
difference in proportions of looks to the target following no implicature or alternative 
primes for participants or items (t1 (29) = -1.31, p = .200, BF = 0.4; t2 (63) = -1.28, p = .207, 
BF = 0.3). This is consistent with the representations not including a specific alternative 
structure. Further support for this conclusion comes from the comparison between 
overlap and no overlap trials; no difference was found (t1 (29) = .29, p = .771, BF = 0.2; t2 
(63) = -.26, p = .797, BF = 0.1). 
Discussion 
There was no difference in looks to target following alternative and no implicature 
primes. There was also no effect of lexical overlap. These results are consistent with the 
exhaustive account where ad hoc implicatures are derived without reference to a specific 
set of alternatives. This is further strengthened by the failure to find an effect of lexical 
overlap.  
General discussion 
In the experiments presented we investigated how priming affects the processing of 
implicatures and tested between two accounts of ad hoc implicature. The first account, the 
specific account, states that ad hoc implicatures are derived by using specific alternatives 
as with scalar implicatures (Bott & Chemla, 2016; Hirschberg, 1981, Rooth, 1985; Stiller, 
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Goodman, & Frank, 2014). The second account, the exhaustive account, suggests that ad 
hoc implicatures are a type of exhaustive inference which do not need specific alternatives. 
Instead there is a general anything else alternative (Geurts, 2010; van Tiel & Schaeken, 
2016). We anticipated facilitatory priming effects after deriving the implicature (strong 
primes, e.g. Bock, 1986; Bock & Griffin, 2000; Pickering & Ferreira, 2008). Based on the 
specific account, facilitatory processing was expected following alternative primes (see 
Chapter 2). The exhaustive account however, does not predict facilitatory priming 
following alternative primes.  
The results of the three experiments presented here are consistent with the 
exhaustive account. Facilitatory effects were found following strong primes but not 
alternative primes. This was seen in Experiment 1 where reaction times following strong 
primes were much faster than following alternative primes. Following alternative primes 
the reaction times were equivalent to trials following weak primes. Experiment 3 also 
showed no difference in processing the implicature following weak or alternative primes 
whereas Experiment 2 demonstrated a priming effect following strong primes. An obvious 
concern is that the exhaustive account relies on the absence of an effect rather than the 
presence of an effect. However, to overcome this limitation we utilised the Bayes Factors 
(BF) analysis. The BF is the ratio of the likelihood of the experimental hypothesis 
explaining the data to the likelihood of the null hypothesis. In this case we were testing the 
specific account and the exhaustive account. The specific account predicted that we would 
find priming following alternative primes and that this priming would be boosted with 
lexical overlap. We failed to find any evidence of priming. We used Bayes Factors to 
interpret the nonsignificant findings (Dienes, 2011, 2014; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, 
& Iverson, 2009). The Bayes Factors calculated were < 0.33 which indicates ‘substantial’ 
evidence for the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2011, 2014); that there was no priming effect 
following alternative primes and there was not lexical boost to priming. Thus we interpret 
this as supporting the exhaustive account. 
The results of this chapter are at odds with previous work. Chapter 2 showed that 
the alternative is important for ad hoc implicature derivation however the results of this 
chapter argue against this for ad hoc implicatures. It is difficult to reconcile these findings 
with those from Bott and Chemla (2016). Bott and Chemla demonstrated cross implicature 
priming; ad hoc implicatures primed scalar implicatures in numbers and quantifiers. They 
suggested this was the consequence of a shared mechanism that searches for the 
alternative but if ad hoc implicatures do not require an alternative in the same way that 
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numbers and quantifiers do then it is not clear what mechanism was responsible for the 
cross implicature priming.  
There are several crucial differences with the experiments presented in this chapter 
and previous work on priming implicatures which may account for the differing results. 
Firstly, in both Bott and Chemla (2016) and Chapter 2, quantifiers and numerals were 
investigated in conjunction with ad hoc implicatures. The proportion of ad hoc 
implicatures derived was significantly lower than for quantifiers and numerals. One 
explanation is that participants learned a convention of how to respond to the ad hoc 
expressions based on their interpretations of the other expressions. However, this is 
unlikely since participants rarely changed their interpretation for ad hoc trials (Chapter 2 
Figures 4 and 7). Another possibility is that the alternative for ad hoc expressions are 
more difficult to derive than the alternative for the other expressions (see Bott & Chemla, 
2016, for a similar point). For ad hoc expressions, the alternative requires adding material 
to the sentence (e.g., the alternative to “There is an A,” was, “There is an A and a D”4). 
Expansion could be more complex for the language processor than replacement. This 
mirrors Katzir (2007), who argues that there is a fundamental difference between 
alternatives formed from replacement and those formed by the addition of material. 
However, based on the results of the experiments this is unlikely. It is plausible that there 
were low rates of implicature derivation because ad hoc implicatures are a distinct 
category and involve different processes or mechanisms. Any differences may have been 
masked by the floor effects. 
Secondly, the tasks in the experiments presented here differed from those in 
Chapter 2. The experiments of Chapter 2 and Bott and Chemla (2016) involved two 
distinct tasks. In prime trials participants were asked to decide which picture matched the 
sentence. In target trials participants were presented with one picture and then the option 
to choose a different picture if they thought there was a picture which would match the 
sentence better. This was intended to give participants the choice of accepting the weak 
interpretation of the sentence or to derive the implicature. However, the target trials do 
not necessarily require participants to calculate the implicature. This is odd because it is a 
different task from the prime trials; participants do not necessarily have to derive an 
implicature, they only have to decide that the picture they are provided with is not 
appropriate. In the present experiments participants did not have to make judgements 
about a “better picture”. 
                                                          
4 The alternative may also be “There is an A and nothing else.” We return to this in Chapter 4. 
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Finally, the experiments presented in this chapter focused on processing time 
whereas previous experiments (Chapter 2, Bott & Chemla) used interpretation 
judgements. Sentence interpretation judgements provide no information about how that 
interpretation is reached. Instead they reflect the end product of online processing and 
conscious decision making. It is possible that the same interpretations are reached 
through different processes. One way to assess this would have been to include an 
implicature prime in Experiment 3. This is a a key limitation; based on the work of Chapter 
2 we did not include an implicature prime for Experiment 3 because it had been seen that 
alternative primes resulted in the same level of priming as implicature primes. The results 
of this experiment demonstrate that offline findings do not always translate into online 
measures. Eye movements during comprehension provide a continuous measure of 
language processing (Tanenhaus et al, 1995). Since eye movements are linked to 
attentional processes, how a participant’s gaze changes in response to stimuli can provide 
some insight into how that stimulus is being processed and an interpretation is reached. 
Consequently, offline measures do not necessarily map onto online processing. However, 
it must be noted that the calculation of looks to the target was as a proportion of looks to 
everything other than the target and this is still quite a crude measure. Overall, the 
experiments presented in this chapter provide further evidence of priming pragmatic 
enrichments along with an investigation into ad hoc implicatures. 
Since priming effects demonstrate the presence of a particular type of 
representation (Branigan & Pickering, 2017) these results indicate pragmatic, or 
implicature specific, representations. The nature of these representations however, is less 
clear. The representations involved would be at the sentence level but based on the 
experiments presented here the representation for ad hoc implicatures would not include 
specific alternatives. Instead the representation would include a more general, anything 
else, alternative. This would be problematic for other types of implicatures which do 
require specific alternatives. However, as shown by van Tiel et al (2014) there is 
considerable variation across different types of implicatures. Consequently it is plausible 
that there are several related representations which are responsible for implicatures. For 
example the representation for quantifier implicatures could be [S & not(S')], where S 
refers to the basic unenriched sentence (e.g. Charlie ate some of the cakes) and S' to the 
informationally stronger sentence (e.g. Charlie ate all of the cakes). Whereas for ad hoc 
implicatures the representation could be [S & not(A)] where A refers to a general anything 
else alternative.  
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Summary 
The aim of the experiments presented in this chapter was twofold. Firstly we 
wanted to investigate how priming affects the online processing of implicatures and 
secondly we wanted to test two explanations of how ad hoc implicatures are derived. The 
results of the experiments show that priming effects facilitate the processing of 
implicatures. Participants’ reaction times are faster after being primed and they are 
quicker to identify a target requiring an implicature after having derived an implicature. 
The experiments also provide some insight into how ad hoc implicatures are derived. 
Unlike traditional accounts of implicature derivation ad hoc implicatures do not appear to 
involve negating a specific alternative. Instead there is a general anything else alternative. 
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Chapter 4: Structural alignment of pragmatic enrichment in 
dialogue. 
Coordination in language is a wide-spread phenomenon whereby interlocutors align 
their language at many different levels. Over time, speakers and listeners adopt the same 
accents, lexical expressions, and even syntactic structures (Branigan, Pickering, & Cleland, 
2000; Cleland, & Pickering, 2003; Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Giles & Powesland, 1975). 
This confers advantages in terms of the predictability of the exchange and ultimately the 
ease with which people can communicate. It is not clear, however, whether coordination 
applies to pragmatic enrichment in the same way as to others areas of language. 
Mechanistic accounts of enrichment are typically described from the listener’s 
perspective, and without representations, and so fail to provide structures that support 
alignment. In this chapter I present a novel paradigm that investigates the production of 
enrichments and test whether enrichment alignment arises in dialogue. 
Pragmatic enrichment takes many forms but some of the most extensively 
researched are Gricean implicatures (Grice, 1989). Consider the following:  
(1) A: I hear Helen’s husband is rich and intelligent. 
B: Well, he’s rich.  
(2) John ate some of the cakes. 
In (1) Speaker B says that Helen’s husband is rich, but implies that he is not 
intelligent. In (2) the speaker says “some” but implies that John did not eat all of the cakes. 
The standard approach for how a listener derives a Gricean implicature assumes that the 
listener considers what the speaker could have said but didn’t. The listener derives the 
implicature through the following steps: (i) reasoning about what B could have said 
instead. What are the alternatives? B could have said “he’s rich and intelligent” (ii) reason 
about why B didn’t say this alternative. The most likely explanation is that he doesn’t 
believe this is true. (iii) B is likely to have an opinion about this alternative. (iv) combining 
(ii) and (iii) yields the implicature that B believes that Helen’s husband is rich but not 
intelligent. (Table 1, adapted from Geurts, 2010, shows the reasoning process in more 
detail for (2)). 
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Reasoning Content Direction 
 “John ate some of the 
cakes.” 
Speech. 
A stronger statement could 
have been made 
(alternative). Why not? 
John ate all of the cakes.  
Speaker must not believe 
that the stronger 
alternative is true. 
¬BELIEVE(John ate all of 
the cakes) 
 
 
Speaker likely has an 
opinion about whether the 
alternative is true. 
BELIEVE(John ate all of the 
cakes) ˅ BELIEVE(¬(John 
ate all of the cakes)) 
 
 
 John ate some but not all of 
the cakes. 
Conceptual understanding. 
Table 1. Standard reasoning stages for Gricean implicatures. Note that the direction of information 
flow is from speech to conceptual understanding. 
Since Grice’s seminal lectures, researchers have analysed implicatures in linguistic 
pragmatics (e.g. Chierchia, 2004; Geurts, 2010; Sauerland, 2004, 2012; Schulz & van Rooij, 
2006) and, more recently, in psychology (e.g. Bott & Noveck, 2004; Breheny, Ferguson & 
Katsos, 2013; Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015; Huang & Snedeker, 2009; Tomlinson, Bailey & 
Bott, 2013). Whilst there is now a wealth of research into Gricean implicatures, all of this 
work takes the listener’s perspective. The focus has been on how individual listeners 
derive an inference5 rather than how a speaker produces an implication or how 
interlocutors engaged in dialogue use implicatures. Consequently, little is known about the 
interaction between production and comprehension in pragmatic enrichment. This is in 
contrast to syntax and semantics where experiments often involve dialogue and 
production. The set of experiments presented in this chapter aim to readdress the 
imbalance by asking whether interlocutors become aligned in dialogue with respect to 
Gricean enrichment. Do speakers and listeners converge on when to enrich expressions? 
Interlocutors typically become aligned across all levels of linguistic representation, 
which in turn facilitates communication (Pickering & Garrod, 2004). Alignment would be 
                                                          
5  When discussing a listener I use the term inference since the listener must infer what the speaker 
means. When discussing a speaker I use the term implication because the speaker implies 
additional meaning. 
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beneficial for the listener because they could predict what the speaker is communicating 
more easily. In particular, since Gricean inferences are optional, the listener would not 
have to engage in reasoning about whether to derive the enrichment. Alignment would 
also be beneficial to the speaker. By knowing the form of expression that would be needed, 
the speaker would not have to choose between a range of formulations and determine 
which one the listener would understand. With respect to implicatures, knowing that the 
listener will correctly derive the inference minimises the risk of miscommunication. 
The results from the previous chapters of this thesis (and Bott & Chemla, 2016) 
demonstrate that Gricean inferences can primed within an individual (within 
comprehension). A listener (reader) was more likely to derive a Gricean inference 
immediately after they had been obliged to derive an enrichment than after a literal 
expression. In other words, inferences can be primed. These findings, together with the 
potential benefit of alignment, argue in favour of enrichment alignment occurring between 
interlocutors. 
However, existing explanations of Gricean enrichments do not provide structures 
that give rise to priming between a speaker and listener. This is because they take the 
perspective of the listener, and not the speaker (or they are not mechanistic accounts at 
all, as in Grice, 1989). Inferences are standardly explained as unidirectional processes, 
from speech to conceptual understanding (see Table 1), that do not work “in reverse.” To 
see this, compare the implication process from the perspective of the listener and the 
speaker. For the listener, the sounds (or letters) are first transformed into words and 
grammar, and then mapped onto concepts. The listener then reasons about possible 
alternative inputs that they could have received from the speaker and about why they 
were not used. That is, inferring is the expansion of a message, and requires additional 
content to be added to the input. For the speaker, concepts are first transformed into 
words and grammar, and then, at some point before articulation, an implicature procedure 
intervenes and reduces the number of words in the utterance (so that the listener can then 
expand the message back to its original conception). The processes of inferring and 
implying operate in different directions and current models of inferring cannot 
straightforwardly be used to explain the interaction between implying and inferring. 
A related problem is that classical theories of Gricean inference do not propose 
abstract representational frames that correspond to implicatures, in the same way that 
syntactic theories propose syntactic frames. Syntactic frames contain the combinatorial 
information for particular syntactic realisations. Combinatorial information defines how 
linguistic units combine to form expressions. For example the sentence give a bone to the 
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dog is a prepositional object construction and contains the combinatorial specification 
noun phrase and prepositional phrase. Alternatively, give the dog a bone is a direct object 
construction with a noun phrase and noun phrase combination. Double object sentences 
prime double object sentences and prepositional object sentences prime prepositional 
object sentences despite both constructions being semantically equivalent (Bock, 1986; 
Bock & Loebell, 1990). This priming effect has been attributed to the activation of 
syntactic frames; after comprehending a sentence which used a particular structure, the 
representation of that structure (the syntactic frame) has an activation advantage over 
other frames and thus is more likely to be repeated (Branigan & Pickering, 2017). Priming 
is found both in the presence and absence of lexical overlap. Since priming is found 
independently of lexical repetition this suggests that these representations are linked to 
but abstract from the lexical elements (e.g. Pickering & Branigan, 1998; Traxler, Tooley, & 
Pickering, 2014).  
Unlike syntax, Gricean inferences are not typically explained in terms of 
representations. Most authors agree that implicatures have a range of properties that 
distinguish them from other components of meaning. For example, Inferences are highly 
context dependent and thought to arise through reasoning processes (as outlined above), 
rather than the retrieval of linguistic elements. Consequently describing inferences in 
terms of static representations would not make sense. Furthermore, in order to derive an 
inference alternative constructions must be considered. This is not necessarily the case 
with standard comprehension; listeners do not typically have to infer content in addition 
to their input. Furthermore, implicatures are optional. Listeners do not have to derive an 
inference in order make a comprehensible sentence. Other features of language are not 
optional in this manner. Finally, taking a Gricean perspective, implicatures must occur at 
the sentence level rather than being sentence components. Overall, if implicatures are 
governed by shared representations then these representations are likely to be distinct 
from those that are assumed by researchers of syntax and semantics (see Branigan & 
Pickering, 2017).  
The following experiments investigated pragmatic alignment between speaker and 
listener. The literature reviewed in the introduction suggests that alignment would be 
beneficial for communicators but current theories of pragmatic enrichment do not provide 
the necessary structures to support it. Although the previous chapter demonstrated 
priming of inferences in comprehension, this effect could be explained by priming of 
comprehension-specific processes and does not demonstrate evidence of representations 
shared by comprehension and production. We test this using a confederate-scripting 
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priming paradigm (adapted from Branigan, Pickering, & Cleland, 2000). If interlocutors 
become aligned with respect to enrichment then it should be possible to prime the 
production of implicatures via their comprehension. 
Experiment overview 
We present four experiments investigating alignment and implicature production. 
The experiments used a confederate scripting priming paradigm in which a participant 
and a confederate took turns describing and identifying a referent card from a set of four 
cards. These cards consisted of rectangles containing either one or two images (see Figure 
1). Cards were displayed on two separate screens (one for the participant and one for the 
confederate), and neither party could see the other’s screen. The referent card was 
identified to the speaker (but not the listener) by being embedded in a bold square. The 
task for the speaker was to communicate to the listener which of the cards was the 
referent card.  
The configuration of the images in the display were the same on each trial. Figure 1 
shows the configuration (left panel) and an example trial (right panel). Crucial to the study 
was the duplication of one object, [A], across cards, so that the A card and the AB card 
shared the same object, [A] e.g. the pencil in Fig.1. This meant that without further 
enrichment, an unmodified single object description involving [A], e.g., “The card with the 
pencil,” was ambiguous between the [A] card and the [AB] card. However, the ambiguity 
could be resolved if the listener derived a Gricean inference, e.g. because the speaker did 
not say the card with the pencil and the book, they must mean the card with pencil only. Of 
course, instead of the speaker obliging the listener to make an inference, the speaker could 
instead disambiguate the referent by using a modifier, e.g., “The card with just a pencil.” 
Figure 1. Left panel shows object configuration. Right panel shows an example trial. 
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Thus, from the speaker’s perspective, they could choose either an unmodified single object 
utterance and expect the listener to derive an inference, or a modifier that was more 
explicit. Speakers similarly had a choice of constructions when the [AB] card was the 
referent6. The speaker could choose between using an unmodified single object utterance 
where they refer to the unique B item on the card e.g. “The card with the book.” This 
would involve cancelling, or defeasing a Gricean inference (“the card with the book,” does 
not mean the card with book only in this context).  Or a conjunction where they name both 
items on the card, e.g. “The card with the book and the pencil.”  
If interlocutors become aligned on when to enrich a sentence then participants 
should produce a description that was sensitive to the form used by the confederate. 
When the confederate used an inference, the participants could also use an inference, and 
when the confederate used a modifier, the participant could also use a modifier.  
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 investigated whether interlocutors show enrichment alignment. 
Alignment was assessed by manipulating the trial sequence. The confederate and 
participant took turns to be the speaker and listener and each described [A] and [AB] 
cards (and fillers). Prime trials were always described by the confederate and target trials 
were described by the participant. Whether the participant (as speaker) chose an 
unmodified single object utterance or a modifier (or a conjunction) was the dependent 
measure.  
The confederate always described the experimental ([A] and [AB]) cards with an 
unmodified single object utterance (“The card with a pencil”) so that to correctly identify 
the [A] card, the participant had to derive an inference, and to identify the [AB] card, they 
had to cancel an inference. In subsequent trials, the participant chose how to describe the 
referent. Alignment predicts that participants would use more unmodified single object 
utterances to describe [A] cards after deriving an inference (after an [A] card) than after 
cancelling one (after an [AB] card). Consequently, an interaction is expected between type 
of confederate (prime) trial and type of participant (target) trial, with rate of unmodified 
single object utterances as the dependent measure. 
                                                          
6 Referring to the [AB] card with an unmodified single object utterance was always sufficient to 
disambiguate this card e.g. “The card with the book” refers to an item that appears on only one card and 
thus disambiguates the card. 
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Method 
Participants 
Thirty-five participants from the Cardiff University community were recruited and 
received course credit for their participation. 
Materials and Counterbalancing 
There were five objects in each display, organized according to Figure 1. The five 
objects were different on every trial. The locations of the card types [A, AB, C, DE] were 
rotated across trials so that each card type appeared equally often in the four possible 
display positions.  
Confederate and participant alternated roles throughout the experiment. There 
were four experimental prime-target sequences [A->A; AB->A; A->AB and AB->AB]. In 
order to boost the priming effect there were two primes, of the same type, before a target. 
Thus the confederate always described two cards (e.g. A->A) before the participant then 
took their turn. To prevent any discrepancy between the confederate’s and the 
participant’s behaviour the participant also described two cards. However, only the first 
description was of interest. The two primes were always of the same type [A->A or AB-
>AB] and targets were either [A or AB]. There were four examples of each prime target 
combination (16 triplets in total). In addition there were 8 [A], 6 [AB], and 2 [CD] “extra” 
cards which the participant described after describing a target. 
 Each experimental sequence was separated by four filler items (to preserve the 
sequence of turn alternation the confederate described two and the participant then 
described two). The confederate described [AB] fillers using a conjunction. The [CD] fillers 
were described using either a conjunction or a simple noun phrase and the [E] fillers were 
described with a simple noun phrase. There were 16 sets of 4 fillers. The confederate 
described 7 [AB] fillers, 13 [CD] fillers (7 conjunction and 6 simple noun phrase), and 12 
[E] fillers (three included the modifier just). The participant described 2 [AB], 9 [CD], 14 
[E], and 7 [A] fillers. The filler trials served several functions. They prevented participants 
from becoming biased towards the [AB] and [A] cards by referring to the other cards in 
the display and they highlighted to the participant the different constructions that could 
be used to describe a card. 
An additional 8 practice quadruplets were presented at the start of the experiment 
to allow participants to get used to the experimental procedure. The practice items 
referred to all of the cards and they were indistinguishable from the main experiment. We 
did not analyse these trials. Consequently there were: 16 x (double prime + target + extra) 
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+ 16 x (filler quad) + 8 x (practice quad) = 160 trials in total. Presentation order was in one 
of two lists. One order was the reverse of the other. 
Procedure 
The confederate was a female native-English speaking 
student from the Cardiff University student population. The 
participant and confederate were sat at opposite sides of a 
table facing a computer screen. They could not see the other 
person’s screen (see Fig. 2). The confederate and participant 
were told:  “You will be playing a game where you take turns 
describing and identifying cards. The same set of cards will 
be displayed on both computer screens. If you see one with a 
bold border it is your turn to describe. To make a guess 
about which card your partner was describing press one of 
the four keys corresponding to the position of the card on 
the screen. Do not speak [to your partner] except to describe 
the card”.  Participants were not allowed to describe the 
position of the card on the screen but, if they needed their 
partner to, they could ask for their partner to repeat their 
description. 
Throughout the instruction stage the experimenter 
treated the confederate like a participant: they collected a 
consent form, demonstrated which keys to press to indicate their choice of card, and 
checked if they had any questions.  
Results 
Analysis procedure 
Two responses out of the 560 produced were excluded due to an experimenter 
error. The remaining 558 utterances were coded with respect to whether they were 
unmodified single object utterances, e.g. “The card with a pencil,” or the alternative 
utterance type. For [A] card trials, the alternative was to use a modifier with the object, e.g. 
“The card with only a pencil” (i.e. to be explicit). For [AB] cards, the alternative was to 
describe both objects, e.g. “The card with a pencil and a ruler.” The dependent variable 
throughout was the proportion of unmodified single object utterances. Data underwent a 
logit transformation and were analysed using ANOVA.  
For non-significant comparisons we report the Bayes Factors (Dienes, 2011, 2014; 
Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). All analyses used the default JZS prior 
Figure 2. Experiment set up. The 
card in bold is the card to be 
described. The speaker in this case is 
the participant. 
Confederate 
Participant 
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(0.707). The JZS prior is a non-informative objective prior that minimises assumptions 
regarding expected effect sizes (Rouder et al., 2009). All Bayes Factors (BF) were 
calculated using JASP (JASP Team, 2016). Bayes factors > 3 suggest ‘substantial’ evidence 
for the alternative hypothesis and Bayes factors < 0.33 indicate ‘substantial’ evidence for 
the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2011, 2014). 
Analysis 
To ensure that participants were paying attention to the confederate’s descriptions 
participants key press responses to prime trials were checked. Participants selected the 
correct card 98% of the time, confirming that they were paying attention to the 
confederate. 
Overall participants’ utterances were not sensitive to the form used by the 
confederate, that is, participants did not demonstrate enrichment alignment (see Figure 
3). Prime type and target type were included in a repeated measures ANOVA as within 
participants factors. There was no effect of prime (F (1, 34) = 2.40, p = .131, BF = 0.23) but 
there was a main effect of target (F (1, 34) = 32.62, p < .001). Participants produced a 
higher proportion of unmodified single object utterances to [A] target cards than to [AB] 
target cards regardless of the prime. There was no interaction (F (1, 34) = .007, p = .932, 
BF = 0.24). 
 
Figure 3. Proportion of unmodified single object utterances to targets. Black bars correspond to [A] 
prime cards and white bars correspond to [AB] prime cards. Error bars show standard error. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 did not find evidence of alignment. Key press responses indicated 
that participants were correctly deriving the inference when they needed to, but this did 
not influence their subsequent utterance.  
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
A AB
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 u
n
m
o
d
if
ie
d
 s
in
g
le
 
o
b
je
ct
 u
tt
er
an
ce
s
Target card
A
AB
Alignment in Dialogue 
79 
 
One explanation for this result is that the comprehension and production processes 
involved in enrichment do not overlap to the same degree as they do for other types 
linguistic structures, such as those used in syntactic processing. Pragmatic alignment 
between interlocutors is perhaps not as useful as syntactic alignment. Another plausible 
explanation relates to the speaker’s inconsistency in the filler trials. In the filler trials the 
confederate used a mixture of simple noun phrases, modified noun phrases, and 
conjunctions. This was done in an attempt to notify the participant to the range of possible 
constructions that could be used to describe the cards. However, this may have affected 
the participants’ ability to align with the confederate. Alignment arises through non-
conscious automatic priming of linguistic structures (Pickering & Garrod, 2004; 2009) and 
results in interlocutors using common coding during production and comprehension. 
Consequently members of a dialogue are able to make predictions about their partner and 
ultimately align their mental representations. If a speaker is not consistent then a listener 
will not be able to align successfully because different structures will be activated across 
the interaction and this will impede their ability to make predictions about their partner 
(Shintel & Keysar, 2007; Graham, Sedivy, & Khu, 2014). Since the confederate’s 
descriptions in Experiment 1 were not consistent then multiple different representations 
would be activated and thus none would have elevated activation levels. Consequently the 
participants would appear insensitive to the priming manipulation. 
This is seen most clearly in participants’ descriptions of the [AB] cards. In prime 
trials the confederate always described the [AB] card using an unmodified single object 
utterance (“It’s the card with an A”). It was only in the filler trials that the confederate 
used a conjunction (“It’s the card with an A and a B”). Despite this the participants 
overwhelmingly preferred to use a conjunction. This is especially interesting when you 
consider that an unmodified single object utterance was always sufficient to disambiguate 
the [AB] card. This explanation is further supported when you also consider participants’ 
descriptions of [A] cards. Across the experiment the [A] cards were mostly described by 
the confederate with an unmodified noun phrase, only four instances used a modifier. 
Analogously participants’ descriptions of [A] cards were predominantly unmodified noun 
phrases despite the fact that this description was ambiguous and therefore not sufficient 
to disambiguate the referent card.  Furthermore, Grodner and Sedivy (2011) found that 
listeners were less likely to derive an inference when their interlocutor was judged as an 
unreliable speaker. The lack of consistency in describing [AB] cards may have marked the 
interlocutor as an unreliable speaker, at least where [AB] cards were concerned. 
Consequently, it is plausible that the lack of a priming effect was a consequence of the 
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confederate’s inconsistent descriptions of double item cards preventing the participant 
from successfully aligning (see also Jaeger & Snider, 2012). 
The second experiment aims to address this issue by introducing a between 
participants manipulation where the confederate’s descriptions are consistent either by 
including a modifier to describe [A] cards or not. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1 participants did not align with the confederate. One explanation is 
that confederate inconsistency affected the participants’ ability to align. Experiment 2 
tested this by removing the conjunctions used in filler items, thereby removing the 
inconsistency, and by including a between participant manipulation of conversational 
style. Thus Experiment 2 investigated two different types of priming, local and global. 
Local priming was the within participants manipulation of the trial sequence as 
described in Experiment 1 and involved the confederate using an implication on some 
trials and cancelling the implication on others. As in Experiment 1 there were four 
possible experimental prime-target sequences [A->A, AB->A; A->AB; and AB->AB] where 
the confederate always described the prime card. 
Global priming relates to a between participants manipulation of the confederate’s 
conversational style. The global priming manipulation considers participants aligning 
instead with the confederate’s overall conversational style. Conversational style was 
manipulated on the [A] cards. In the explicit condition, the confederate included modifiers, 
e.g. just, as in, “The card with just the pencil”, and in the implicit condition, they did not, as 
in “The card with the pencil”.  In both conditions the [AB] card was always referred to by 
the confederate with a simple noun phrase and the referent was always the B item on the 
card e.g. “The card with the book.” In subsequent trials, the participant chose how to 
describe the referent. To describe the [A] card, they could use an unmodified noun phrase, 
just as the confederate did, or they could use a modifier, such as “just” or “only” (“The card 
with just a pencil”). To describe the [AB] card, they could use an unmodified noun phrase, 
or they could use a conjunction and describe the A and B objects (“The card with the book 
and the pencil”).  
If participants show enrichment alignment then we expect to find global and local 
priming effects. We expect participants to produce more unmodified descriptions in the 
implicit condition than the explicit condition. These are global effects. We expect to find 
local priming effects in the implicit condition but not the explicit condition. This is because 
in the implicit condition there were no implicature trials; all trial sequences predicted low 
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implicature activation levels. Thus there were no theoretical reasons why participants 
should prefer to use an implicature in A->A sequences than in an AB->A sequences, say, or 
more in A->AB than in AB->AB sequences. 
In the implicit condition participants should produce higher rates of unmodified 
descriptions for A targets in [A->A] sequences than [AB->A] sequences because in the A 
trials the confederate uses an implication whereas in AB trials the confederate cancels any 
implication (there is no card which corresponds to “The card with the [B] and nothing 
else”). The opposite is predicted for AB targets, participants should produce lower rates of 
unmodified descriptions for [A -> AB] sequences than [AB -> AB] trials. Following AB 
prime trials using an unmodified description is acceptable whereas following an A prime 
this would indicate the need for an implicature. Consequently an interaction is predicted 
for the implicit condition between type of confederate (prime) trial and type of participant 
(target) trial, with rate of unmodified descriptions as the dependent measure. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-five participants from the Cardiff University community were recruited and 
received either course credit or payment. 
Design and hypothesis 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the implicit condition (N = 17) or the 
explicit condition (N = 18). The difference between the conditions was the style adopted 
by the confederate. In the explicit condition, the confederate always used a modified single 
object utterance to describe the [A] card, e.g. “the card with just the pencil,” but in the 
implicit condition they always used an unmodified single object utterance, “the card with 
the pencil.” Thus in the explicit condition participants never derived an inference but in 
the implicit condition participants needed to derive an inference to identify the [A] card 
referent. All other aspects of the design were the same as in Experiment 1. 
Materials 
Since the use of two primes in Experiment 1 did not have an effect single primes 
were used in Experiment 2. Experimental items used the same structure as in Experiment 
1 and most of the same items were reused. In the explicit condition [A] cards were 
described using one of four modifiers: only, just, on its own, by itself. Each modifier was 
used 4 times across the experiment with an equal number appearing the first and second 
half of the experiment. 
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 Experimental pairs were separated by filler pairs. Filler items differed from 
Experiment 1 in that they only referred to the [CD] and [E] cards and were always 
described, by the confederate, using a single object utterance. An additional 8 practice 
pairs were included at the start of the experiment to allow participants to get used to the 
experimental procedure. These were a mixture of [A], [AB], [CD], and [E] cards. Thus there 
were 32 x (prime + target) + 32 x (filler pair) + 8 x (practice pair) = 144 trials. 
Presentation order was in one of two lists. One order was the reverse of the other. 
Results 
The same analysis procedure as in Experiment 1 was used. We excluded 22 out of 
1120 utterances because of an error in a picture. To ensure that participants were paying 
attention to the confederate’s descriptions key press responses to prime trials were 
checked. Participants selected the correct card 98% of the time. Therefore we can be 
confident that they were paying attention to the confederate. 
Local priming 
Each condition was tested separately. Figure 4 shows the results for the explicit 
condition. Using a two factor repeated measures ANOVA, for the explicit condition there 
were no main effects and no interaction (F's (1, 17) < 1.91, p's > .185, BF's < .27). In the 
implicit condition we found no main effect of prime (F (1, 16) = 1.43, p = .249, BF = .30, 
95% CI = -.52 - .15) nor target (F (1, 16) = 1.76, p = .203, BF = 1.31, 95% CI = -.32 – 1.40). 
Crucially, however, there was an interaction between prime and target (F (1, 16) = 9.99, p 
= .006), whereby the unmodified single object prime raised the rate of unmodified single 
object utterances on A trials but lowered them for AB trials (see Figure 5). Pairwise 
comparisons showed that this effect was observable on the AB trials but not on the A trials 
(t (16) = 2.53, p = .022; t (16) = 1.52, p = .148, BF = .65).  
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Figure 4. Proportion of unmodified single object utterances to targets in the explicit condition. Black 
bars correspond to [A] prime cards and white bars correspond to [AB] prime cards. Error bars show 
standard error. 
 
Figure 5. Proportion of unmodified single object utterances to targets in the implicit condition. Black 
bars correspond to [A] prime cards and white bars correspond to [AB] prime cards. Error bars show 
standard error. 
Data from the local priming provided evidence that deriving inferences as a listener 
influenced the use of implications as a speaker, unlike in Experiment 1. This is in line with 
the predictions of enrichment alignment. 
Global priming 
Implicit and explicit utterances were also compared independently of trial order. 
Participants in the explicit condition produced a smaller proportion of unmodified 
utterances on the [A] card trials than those in the implicit condition, M = 0.18 vs M = 0.91 
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(F (1, 31) = 108.50, p < .001, 95% CI = 4.17-4.20). Thus, participants were sensitive to the 
structures used by the confederate. Surprisingly, however, there were also differences on 
the [AB] cards (which were described with a single object utterance in both conditions). 
Here, participants had the choice between using expressions referring to the (B) object 
alone, or naming the (A) and the (B) in a conjunctive sentence. Participants in the explicit 
condition used significantly fewer single object utterances than those in the implicit 
condition, M = 0.15 vs M = 0.82, (F (1, 31) = 58.21, p < .001, 95% CI = -.27 - .50).  
Note that the direction of the latter effect is the opposite to what elevating 
implicature activation levels might predict. If implicature mechanisms were more strongly 
activated in the implicit condition, an utterance of the form, “The card with a [B]” would 
strongly (and misleadingly) imply a card with a B and nothing else. Participants in the 
implicit condition should therefore have used more conjunctions than those in the explicit 
condition so as to avoid potentially misleading the listener. This effect therefore suggests 
that processes in addition to implicature mechanisms were being primed with the global 
manipulation.  
One explanation for the effect on the A card was that lexical material (modifiers) 
were primed in the explicit condition. For example, after hearing “The card with only an 
[A]”, the modifier “only” could become particularly salient and influence the choice about 
whether to use an implicature or a modified expression. This was tested by examining the 
modifiers used by the participant as a function of the modifiers used by the confederate. If 
the priming effect were lexically based, participants should use the same modifier on trial 
N as the confederate used in trial N-1. Figure 6 shows the results for the explicit condition 
(modified responses were too low to be meaningful in the implicit condition). For each 
modifier there were a large proportion of responses that did not use the same modifier as 
the confederate. For example, for “only”, 60% of the responses used a different modifier 
while 18% used the same modifier (the remainder used an unmodified expression). The 
proportion of trials in which the same modifier was used was sufficiently small that we 
were able to analyse the data after removing these trials (4.5%). When we did this, 
participants were still more likely to use unmodified utterances when the confederate was 
also implicit, (F (1, 31) = 98.00, p < .001, 95% CI = 4.01 – 6.09). Thus, the priming effect 
cannot be entirely due to lexical priming. 
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Figure 6. Proportion of participant utterances using no modifier or using the same or different 
modifier to the one heard. Error bars show standard error. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 investigated enrichment alignment through two different 
manipulations. The first, global, manipulated the form of the confederate’s descriptions of 
the [A] cards. In the implicit condition the confederate used unmodified simple noun 
phrases and in the explicit condition the confederate used a modified simple noun phrase. 
Descriptions of the [AB] cards were kept constant across both conditions. Participants in 
the implicit condition produced significantly more unmodified single object utterances 
than those in the explicit condition. This pattern was seen for both [A] and [AB] target 
cards. The second, local, manipulated the trial-by-trial sequence. No effect was found in 
the explicit condition since no trials required an inference. In the implicit condition 
however, participants were sensitive to the utterance used by the confederate and 
demonstrated enrichment alignment. After having made an inference participants were 
more likely to then produce an implicature. The results suggest that there are 
representations or processes corresponding to implicatures that can be activated and 
deactivated during conversation. After comprehending an inference the representations 
involved had an activation advantage over other representations that were not used. 
Consequently these implicature representations were more likely to be used in 
subsequent speech production. After cancelling an inference, the implicature 
representations’ activation was suppressed thereby reducing the likelihood of them being 
used for subsequent production.  
The comparison of implicit to explicit utterances revealed large alignment effects. 
However, it is not clear what kind of alignment occurred. While alignment of Gricean 
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processes or representations explains the effect on the [A] cards (the modifiers in the 
explicit condition might suppress the Gricean representations), it predicts the reverse 
effect on the [AB] cards. If inference mechanisms were suppressed generally in the explicit 
condition, there should have been more single object utterances than in the implicit 
condition, not fewer. It could be that in the global effect reflects participants aligning with 
the confederate with respect to conciseness. When the confederate used short expressions, 
so did the participant, and when the confederate used more complete, but longer 
expressions (i.e. by including the modifier), so did the participant. Note that this 
explanation does not apply to the local priming effect because the direction of the effect 
was in the opposite direction. 
Experiment 2 used a confederate as the interlocutor. However, we have no way of 
knowing whether participants believed our deception. Our results could therefore be a 
consequence of participants believing that the conversational partner was an 
experimenter. In Experiment 3 we tested this by manipulating whether the partner was 
presented as an experimenter or another participant. 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 had two aims. The first was to replicate the alignment effects observed 
in Experiment 2 and the second was to investigate how the social status of the confederate 
affected alignment. In one condition participants were informed that their partner was an 
experimenter whereas in the other condition the confederate was treated like another 
participant. 
There is reason to believe that an individual’s perception of their interlocutor 
influences their utterances.  Behavioural and linguistic imitation, or mimicry, is seen when 
interacting with someone of a higher status and is often linked to the desire to be liked by 
that person (e.g. van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & van Knippenberg, 2004; Bandura & 
Kupers, 1964; Branigan, Pickering, Pearson, & McLean, 2010; Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 
2008; McGuigan, 2013). There is also evidence that mimicry is used for in group 
affilitation; individuals demonstrate greater imitation to their in-group (e.g. Bourgeois & 
Hess, 2008; Welkowitz, Feldstein, Finkelstein, & Aylesworth, 1972; Yabar, Johnston, Miles, 
& Peace 2006). The degree of alignment however, is modulated by social factors 
(Weatherholtz, Campbell-Kibler, & Jaeger, 2014). 
Consequently, manipulating the status of the confederate could affect the strength of 
alignment observed. One the one hand, if participants believe their partner to be an 
experimenter this may lead to greater alignment since the experimenter is in a position of 
authority and in this context could be considered to be of higher social status of the 
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confederate. By aligning with the experimenter the participant signals similarity with the 
experimenter which could serve to enhance success in the task (e.g. Giles & Powesland, 
1975; Smith, Brown, Strong, & Rencher, 1975). On the other hand though there may be 
greater alignment when the participant believes their partner is another participant 
because they are similar and are part of the same group. Thus, participants may perceive 
their partner as more likeable and demonstrate greater alignment (Balcetis & Dale, 2005; 
Hwang & Chun, 2018). Alternatively there may be no effect of this manipulation. Branigan 
et al (2003) investigated alignment in human-computer interaction and found that 
participants displayed similar levels of alignment when interacting with a human as when 
interacting with a computer. Thus it is possible that manipulating the role of the 
confederate will not influence the level of alignment. 
Orthogonal predictions can be reached about the overall levels of implicit language 
use. Participants might choose to use more implications overall in the experimenter 
condition. Since the experimenter would generally be in a position of knowledge, there 
would be little risk of miscommunication by using implications. Alternatively, participants 
might use fewer implications because if the partner were the experimenter, participants 
might feel they have to be particularly informative and precise in their responses. 
The basic design was exactly the same as Experiment 2. The only difference was that 
one group of participants were told that the partner was an experimenter and in the other 
group they were not. In the latter group, there was an experimenter and a confederate, 
whereas in the former group one experimenter played the role of both experimenter and 
conversational partner. 
Method 
Participants 
Fifty participants from the Cardiff University community were recruited and 
received either course credit or payment. 
Design and Materials 
The materials and design were the same as in Experiment 2 apart from the addition 
of a between participant confederate manipulation. 
The confederate took the role of either a participant or an experimenter. When the 
confederate undertook the role of participant the true participant was unaware of their 
partner’s involvement in the experiment. As in the previous experiments reported in this 
chapter, the participant was unaware that their partner was a confederate. However, 
when the confederate took the role of experimenter the participant was aware that their 
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partner was not a participant. The experimenter informed the participant that they would 
be playing a communication game together and instructed the participant of their task. 
Results 
Ten participants were excluded due to a problem with the microphone. The data 
from the remaining forty participants were analysed. 
Confederate role 
Numerically, participants produced more implicit descriptions when they knew the 
confederate was the experimenter compared to when they thought the confederate was 
another participant (see Fig. 7). Despite the numerical difference this was not statistically 
significant (F (1, 36) = 1.13, p =.296, BF = 0.39, 95% CI = -1.28 – .40), nor was there was an 
interaction between interlocutor role and conversational style (F (1, 36) = .13, p = .73, BF = 
0.3).   
 
Figure 7. Proportion of unmodified single object utterances to targets. Black bars correspond to the 
participant condition and white bars correspond to the experimenter condition. Error bars show 
standard error. 
Local priming 
Collapsed across the implicit and explicit groups the main effects of Experiment 2 
were replicated (see Fig. 8). There was no effect of prime (F (1, 32) = .016, p = .90, BF = 
0.17) or target (F (1, 32) = 3.58, p =.068, BF = 6.78). However, there was an interaction 
between prime type and target (F (1, 32) = 6.64, p =.015). Following an [A] card prime 
participants descriptions of [A] card targets were more implicit but when the target was 
an [AB] card descriptions were more explicit.  We examined the interaction with pairwise 
comparisons and found this effect was observable on the AB targets but not the A targets 
(t (39) = 2.06, p = .046; t (39) = 1.52, p = .136, BF = .49). 
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Looking at the implicit group alone there was no effect of prime, target and the 
interaction was nearing significant (F (1, 18) = .567, p = .461, BF = .03; F (1, 18) = .613, p = 
.444, BF = .47; F (1, 18) = 4.10, p = .058, BF = .50). 
 
Figure 8. Proportion of unmodified single object utterances to targets. Black bars correspond to [A] 
prime cards and white bars correspond to [AB] prime cards. Error bars show standard error. 
The general pattern of results was the same when taking each partner role 
separately. However, there was no significant interaction when the partner was a 
participant (F (1, 16) = 3.01, p=.10, BF = 0.5) or when the partner was an experimenter (F 
(1, 16) = 4.18, p=.058, BF = 0.4). The Bayes Factors give no reason to suggest that these 
nonsignificant results were anything else but a lack of power. 
 
Global priming 
Participants in the implicit condition produced more implicit utterances than those 
in the explicit condition (F (1, 36) = 45.72, p < .001, 95% CI = 1.97 – 3.65). On the [A] card 
trials participants in the implicit condition produced a greater proportion of unmodified 
single object utterances, M = 0.84 vs M = 0.21 (F (1, 36) =74.64, p < .001, 95% CI = 3.08 – 
5.00). Thus the production choices of the participant were influenced by the confederate. 
This pattern was also observed for the [AB] cards. Participants in the implicit condition 
used significantly fewer unmodified single object utterances than those in the explicit 
condition, M = 0.78 vs M = 0.56, (F (1, 36) = 5.06, p = .031, 95% CI = .15 – 3.01) 
(participants who didn’t use single object utterances used conjunctions involving both 
objects). 
Participants’ use of modifiers was analysed as in Experiment 2 to ensure that the 
global priming results couldn’t be accounted for by the repetition of lexical material. If the 
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priming effect was lexically based then participants should use the same modifier as the 
confederate used on the immediately preceding trial. As in Experiment 2 there were a 
large proportion of responses that did not use the same modifier as the confederate (see 
Fig. 9). The proportion of trials in which the same modifier was used was sufficiently small 
that we were able to analyse the data after removing these trials (4.6%). When we did this 
participants were still more likely to use unmodified conditions when the confederate was 
also implicit (F (1,32) = 62.31, p <.001, 95% CI = 2.81 – 4.76). 
 
 
Figure 9. Proportion of responses using the same, different, or no modifier. Error bars show standard 
error. 
Discussion 
The main findings from Experiment 2 were replicated:  Participants were more 
likely to produce implicit constructions when their interlocutor was using implicit 
constructions than when they were using explicit constructions. These effects were shown 
for local and global priming manipulations. 
There was no influence of the social status of the conversational partner. There were 
no significant main effects nor interactions of the partner manipulation. However, Bayes 
Factors indicated that the experiment lacked the necessary sensitivity to support the null 
hypothesis in this respect. We therefore leave the question about the role of social status 
in priming to further research. Importantly, global priming effects occurred regardless of 
the partner role, and local priming effects showed similar patterns in both conditions but 
were narrowly nonsignificant. Therefore, the priming effects observed in Experiment 2 
were not due to particular strategies adopted by participants disbelieving that the partner 
was another participant. Instead participants were showing enrichment alignment. 
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Participants in Experiments 2 and 3 displayed enrichment alignment. They were 
more likely to produce implications after comprehending an implication. These results 
differ to those of Experiment 1 where participants did not show alignment. We suggested 
that this was a consequence of the confederate’s descriptions in filler trials being 
inconsistent. The inconsistency lies in the informativity of the description. The filler 
descriptions of double item cards, [AB] or [CD], used a mixture of simple noun phrases and 
conjunctions. In experimental trials, [AB] cards were always described using a simple 
noun phrase, which was sufficient for disambiguating the referent. Despite this, 
participants preferred to use conjunctions to describe [AB] cards. Conversely the majority 
of participants’ descriptions of [A] cards were simple noun phrases and thus ambiguous 
without deriving an implicature. That is, participants were not susceptible to the local 
priming effect; they did not align with respect to enrichment. In Experiment 2 and 3 the 
confederate’s descriptions were consistent throughout the experiment and participants 
displayed enrichment alignment along with alignment on conversational style. However, 
conversational style was manipulated between-participants.  
Experiment 4 manipulated the conversational style within participants by altering 
the confederate’s descriptions of [A] cards; half of the descriptions used simple noun 
phrases and the other half used modified noun phrases. Altering the conversational style 
at a local level provides a way of testing how interlocutor in consistency affects 
enrichment alignment.  If inconsistency interferes with enrichment alignment then 
participants should be less susceptible to the trial-by-trial manipulation (local effect in the 
previous experiments). 
Experiment 4 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two Cardiff University undergraduate students participated for either 
payment or course credit. 
Materials and Design 
The items from Experiment 2 were used. [A] card descriptions were split into 
modified and unmodified descriptions such that there were 8 instances of each. The same 
modifiers as in experiment 2 were used and each appeared twice throughout the 
experiment; once in each half. The 8 modified [A] cards were swapped across two lists, 
these lists were then reversed giving a total of 4 counterbalancing lists. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the lists. All other details remained the same.  
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Results 
Each participant produced 32 target responses. Of the 1024 responses 46 were 
excluded due to experimenter error. To ensure that participants were paying attention to 
the confederate’s descriptions we looked at key press responses to prime trials. 
Participants selected the correct card 95% of the time hence they were paying attention to 
the confederate. The same analysis procedure from the previous experiments was 
followed. Figure 10 shows participants responses to each target type following each 
prime. We assessed the modifier effect (A and modified A) primes separately to the local 
priming effect (on A and AB primes). 
 
Figure 10. Proportion of unmodified single object utterances to targets. Black bars correspond to [A] 
prime cards and white bars correspond to [AB] prime cards. Grey bars correspond to [A] prime cards 
that were described with a modifier.  Error bars show standard error. 
Modifier effect 
To assess the effect of the modifier  a 2x2 ANOVA was run with prime type (A, 
Modified A) and target type (A and AB) as within participant factors. A main effect of 
prime was found (F (1, 28) = 5.41, p = .028). The effect of target was not significant (F (1, 
28) = 3.00, p = .094, BF = 5.31) and there was no interaction (F (1, 28) = .39, p = .680, BF = 
0.27). After hearing a modifier participants were less likely to produce an unmodified 
single object utterance but this was only the case for the [A] target cards (t (31) = 2.11, p = 
.043; t (31) = 1.13, p = .265, BF = 1.32). 
Local priming 
Enrichment alignment was assessed by comparing responses following [A] and [AB] 
primes. A 2x2 ANOVA with prime (A and AB) and target (A and AB) as within participant 
factors was run. As in Experiments 2 and 3 there were no effects of prime (F (1, 28) = .003, 
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p = .954, BF = .19) or target (F (1, 28) = 3.30, p = .080, BF = 11.52). Unlike the previous 
experiments however, there was also no interaction (F (1, 28) = .86, p = .358, BF = 0.314). 
Discussion 
Experiment 4 investigated the effect of speaker inconsistency on enrichment 
alignment. A within participant manipulation was used where the confederate’s 
descriptions of [A] cards either included or omitted a modifier. This was predicted to 
disrupt the participant’s ability to successfully align with the confederate. By 
inconsistently using implications the confederate impeded the priming of the participant’s 
implicature representations, thereby reducing the activation of these representations and 
thus decreasing the likelihood of their use. The results of Experiment 4 support this.  
Overall Experiment 4 appears to offer some support to the hypothesis that 
individuals do become aligned with respect to enrichment but that this alignment is 
sensitive to the consistency of their interlocutor. 
General Discussion 
The experiments presented in this chapter investigated the structural alignment of 
pragmatic enrichment. Taken together, they demonstrate that interlocutors become 
aligned on enrichment and that the extent of alignment is affected by interlocutor 
consistency. It is important to note that experiments investigating social factors typically 
have larger sample sizes than those of the experiments presented here. In some of the 
experiments presented above (particularly Experiment 3) there is indication that there is 
low power (Bayesian analysis) and thus the conclusions drawn from these experiments 
require further investigation. Despite this, evidence for two different types of priming was 
found: local and global. Local priming was the main test of enrichment alignment and was 
investigated by manipulating the trial sequence. Participants’ use of implications was 
influenced by whether or not the confederate had used an implicature in the preceding 
trial. Global priming on the other hand reflected a different type of priming where 
participants aligned with the confederate’s overall conversational style. We discuss these 
results in more detail below. 
Local priming 
Participants’ use of implicatures was influenced on a trial-by-trial basis depending 
on whether or not the confederate had used an implicature in the previous trial. There was 
an interaction between prime and target. For [A] target trials, after making an inference 
participants were more likely to produce an unmodified noun phrase. Whereas for [AB] 
target trials, after making an inference participants were less likely to use an unmodified 
noun phrase. In other words, if the confederate had used an implicature in the previous 
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trial participants were more likely to use an implicature to describe an [A] target but were 
more likely to use a conjunction to describe an [AB] target. This can be accounted for by 
shared representations between comprehension and production. After making an 
inference (comprehending), the representations involved retained activation so that when 
it was the participant’s turn to describe a card, they were more likely to reuse the shared 
representations and thus, in the case of an [A] target, to produce an implicature.  
The case is more complicated for [AB] cards. Recall that [AB] cards contained two 
items, one of which was unique to the card and one of which was shared with another 
card. Thus a sufficient description needed only to refer to the single unique referent (B 
image) since that was unambiguous. Alternatively, participants could have used a 
conjunction and named both referents. Therefore, participants’ descriptions of [AB] cards 
never truly used implicatures. Despite this, whether or not the participant had made an 
inference did influence their subsequent description of [AB] cards. After making an 
inference participants were more likely to use a conjunction than refer to the single item. 
This too can be explained in terms of shared representations. After making an inference, 
describing the [AB] card using the single unique referent would be misleading since the 
implication, the card with the [B] and nothing else, would not identify any of the cards. 
Describing both items on the card avoids this problem. That participants’ descriptions of 
[AB] cards were influenced by whether or not they had made an inference is especially 
interesting considering that the confederate only ever used a single referent in their 
descriptions. 
These results can be explained by a shared representation as follows. The 
implicature representation is a sentence level representation [S ∧  ¬ S′] where S refers to 
the basic unenriched sentence and Sˈ to the informationally stronger alternative. Consider 
an [A] card prime. The confederate’s description “the card with the [A]” corresponds to S 
and the informationally stronger alternative, S′ , is “the card with the [A] and the [B].” In 
order to identify the [A] card the participant must derive the implicature “the card with 
the [A] and not the card with the [A] and the [B].” Thus the [S ∧  ¬ S′] representation will 
retain some activation when it is then the participant’s turn to describe a card and hence is 
more likely to be reused. 
Global priming 
Now consider the results from the global priming. Participants in the implicit 
condition produced more unmodified single object utterances than those in the explicit 
condition. This is consistent with there being shared representations between 
comprehension and production. However this alone cannot account for the results. 
Alignment in Dialogue 
95 
 
Consider the [AB] cards again. If implicature representations were more strongly activated 
in the implicit condition then the use of the single referent description would be 
misleading due to the implicature. Consequently there should have been more 
conjunctions used to describe the [AB] card in the implicit condition and fewer in the 
explicit condition. Interestingly the opposite pattern was seen; in the implicit condition 
there were fewer conjunction descriptions of [AB] and more in the explicit condition. This 
effect therefore suggests that processes in addition to implicature mechanisms were being 
primed with the global manipulation.  
It is not clear what these processes are. It could be that in the implicit condition 
participants were being primed to be concise, or to speak efficiently, whereas in the 
explicit condition participants had no such constraint. Efficiency has been proposed as an 
explanation for why people produce implicatures (Levinson, 2000). Using implicatures 
could be considered as speaking efficiently. Compared to speech preparation processes 
articulation is very slow which causes a bottleneck (Levinson, 2000; Wheeldon & Levelt, 
1995). The effect of the bottleneck however, can be minimized by reducing the amounts of 
material to be articulated (Grice, 1989; Levinson, 2000). Whilst this does not account for 
the local priming effects, since efficiency was not changed within conditions, it could 
account for the global priming effects. 
More broadly, the global priming effects are likely to relate to audience design. It is 
well established that speakers often tailor their utterances to suit the addressee (e.g. 
Brown-Schmidt, Yoon & Ryskin, 2015; Keysar, Barr, Balin, Brauner, 2000). For example in 
referential communication games where a speaker interacts with two independent 
interlocutors the speaker will adjust their choice of referent based on their past 
experience with the particular addressee (Garrod & Doherty, 1994; Horton & Gerrig, 2002, 
2005). Similarly a speakers choice to use modifiers to describe an object is influenced by 
whether their partner can see a contrastive item (e.g. using “big glass” when the addressee 
can see two glasses but omitting the modifier if the addressee can only see one of the two 
glasses; Brown-Schmidt & Konopka, 2011; Engelhardt, Bailey, & Ferreira, 2006; Horton & 
Keysar, 1996). In the case of the experiments presented in this chapter audience design 
may account for the global priming effects. 
In the implicit condition of Experiments 2 and 3, based on the local priming, it was 
expected that participants would use more conjunctions to describe [AB] cards than in the 
explicit condition. Instead the opposite patterns was found. There were more conjunction 
descriptions in the explicit condition. We suggest that participants were tailoring their 
descriptions based on the overall conversational style. As discussed above it could be 
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based on efficiency. In the implicit condition the confederate used unmodified single 
object utterances to describe [A] and [AB] cards which were short (and therefore efficient 
descriptions) whereas in the explicit condition the confederate used modifiers to describe 
[A] cards which may be considered less efficient (from a speaker’s perspective). 
Whilst efficiency, and audience design, can account for the global priming effect they 
cannot account for the local priming effect since these results were in the opposite 
direction to the predictions of an efficiency account.  
Interlocutor inconsistency 
When the confederate was inconsistent in their descriptions this reduced the 
participants’ ability to align; after deriving an inference participants were no more likely 
to produce an implicature than if they had not derived an inference.  Alignment relies on 
priming whereby a structure retains residual activation after being used and is thus more 
easily used on a subsequent occasion. Inconsistency may affect this by activating multiple 
different structures and therefore preventing one structure from gaining an advantage 
over another (if priming occurs cumulatively over the course of the experiment, e.g. 
Kaschak, Kutta, & Coyle, 2014). This explanation is inconsistent with work on syntax 
which sees not only priming immediately after encountering a structure, but also priming 
effects which last for multiple intervening trials which use different structures (e.g. Bock & 
Griffin, 2000; Segaert, Wheeldon, & Hagoort, 2016). 
Instead, interlocutor inconsistency is more likely to affect the participant’s ability to 
tailor their utterance to their partner. Successful audience design relies on consistency 
(much in the same way that priming does) in order to be able to make predictions about 
the addressee (Graham, Sedivy, & Khu, 2014; Jaeger & Snider, 2012; Shintel & Keysar, 
2007). The interlocutor inconsistency in Experiments 1 and 4 are likely to affect the 
participant’s evaluation of their partner’s pragmatic ability7. In Experiment 1 the 
confederate described single item cards ([A] and [E]) using an unmodified single object 
utterance most of the time thus the participant can be confident that the confederate will 
correctly derive the implicature when the [A] card is the target. In Experiment 1 the 
inconsistency arose on the double item cards ([AB] and [CD]); on some trials the 
confederate would use an unmodified single object utterance and in others they would use 
the conjunction. The confederate consistently described [A] cards using a single object 
utterance and this indicated the use of an implicature. Using a single object utterance to 
describe an [AB] card however did not indicate the use of an implicature. Instead, an 
                                                          
7 I am not claiming that this is a conscious evaluation of pragmatic ability.  
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implicature interpretation would have to be cancelled if it were derived. However, because 
the confederate described these cards inconsistently it is possible that the participant 
could not be sure that using a single object utterance would allow the confederate to 
identify the card and thus used conjunctions irrespective of the structure the confederate 
had used. 
 Summary 
The aim of the experiments presented in this chapter was to investigate the 
interaction between the production and comprehension of implicatures and see whether 
interlocutors become aligned based on pragmatic enrichment. The results of the 
experiments demonstrate that interlocutors do become aligned on when to enrich a 
sentence. However, the extent of alignment is affected by interlocutor consistency. We 
suggest that the locus of alignment is an implicature specific representation that is shared 
between the production and comprehension systems.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
The experiments presented in this thesis made use of structural priming to investigate the 
nature of pragmatic enrichments. Overall this thesis makes several important contributions to 
our understanding of pragmatic enrichments. Chapter 2 demonstrated that the salience of the 
alternative is vital for the derivation of scalar implicatures and that adults are sensitive to 
alternative salience. In Chapter 3 we focused on ad hoc implicatures and found that for ad hoc 
implicature derivation rather than generate contextually based alternatives there is a general 
anything else alternative that is used. The final chapter found that interlocutors’ use of 
implicatures becomes aligned but the extent of alignment is affected by interlocutor 
consistency. 
Chapter 2 compared two models of implicature derivation. The first, the combination 
mode, states that implicature derivation involves the distinct stages of identifying appropriate 
alternatives and then negating these alternatives. In this model the identification of alternatives 
and their subsequent use are two separate stages in the processing of implicatures. The second 
model, the salience model, states that the derivation of an implicature is contingent upon the 
salience of the alternative alone. That is, this model does not posit the involvement of a separate 
usage mechanism; the usage mechanism is applied automatically providing the alternative is 
sufficiently salient. Existing theories of implicature derivation are not explicit about this 
distinction however they can be broadly mapped onto these models. The evidence from Chapter 
2 favours a salience model; we did not find evidence of an independent usage mechanism.  This 
addresses a question posed by Bott and Chemla (2016).  
Bott and Chemla (2016) demonstrated within and between expression priming of scalar 
implicatures. They suggested that the priming effects could be accounted for by either priming a 
mechanism that searches for the alternative or a usage mechanism that negates the alternative. 
Based on Chapter 2 the priming effects in Bott and Chemla are likely due to priming the search 
for alternatives rather than a usage mechanism. Whilst Bott and Chemla talk about mechanisms, 
their findings are not inconsistent with priming a general implicature representation (as 
discussed below). Of course, the work in Chapter 2 only looked at within expression priming 
and thus cannot necessarily speak to between expression priming. However, it would be 
interesting to see whether between expression priming is observed when the prime is the 
alternative.  
Chapter 3 investigated ad hoc implicatures. Typically research into implicatures focuses 
on a limited range of categories, predominantly quantifiers and disjunctions (see van Tiel et al, 
2014). Contrary to the uniformity assumption recent work has demonstrated that that findings 
from a particular category cannot be generalised to other categories (Doran et al, 2009; 2012; 
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van Tiel et al, 2014). Thus it is important to investigate a range of implicature categories. By 
investigating ad hoc implicatures the work of this chapter demonstrates the need to examine a 
range of expressions with a range of techniques in order to understand implicatures more fully. 
The results of Experiment 3 in this chapter are at odds with the findings of Chapter 2 and this is 
most likely due to the different tasks used across the experiments. 
Ad hoc implicatures are distinct from other scalar implicatures because they are 
determined entirely by the context of the discourse; there is no lexicalised scale from which to 
draw alternatives from. The work of Chapter 3 investigated whether deriving ad hoc 
implicatures involved calculating a contextually based scale of alternatives or whether there 
was a general purpose alternative. The results were consistent with a general purpose 
alternative (i.e. anything else) as suggested by Geurts (2010). 
 This is further supported when considering the developmental trajectory of implicature 
derivation. Children often struggle with implicatures that arise from quantifiers whereas the 
same difficulties are not seen for ad hoc implicatures or number implicatures (e.g. Gualmini et 
al, 2001; Huang & Snedeker, 2009; Noveck, 2001; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003; Stiller, 
Goodman, & Frank, 2014). This difference has been attributed to difficulty in generating 
appropriate alternatives for quantifiers. Ad hoc and number implicatures do not have the same 
difficulty. For numbers the alternatives are clearly relevant because when children are learning 
numbers they learn them in a scale such that the relation between numbers is clear. In the case 
of ad hoc implicatures, if the speaker did not say anything else they likely did not mean anything 
else thus the general anything else alternative is also easily accessible. 
The finding that there is a general purpose alternative rather than a specific contextual is 
interesting because in Chapter 2 we found priming of ad hoc implicatures from an alternative 
prime. This suggested that the ad hoc implicature was derived using a contextually based 
alternative structure. However, that is not what was found in Chapter 3. The most likely 
explanation for this relates to the different methodologies and tasks across the two 
experiments. In Chapter 2 an offline measure, choice proportions, was used whereas in Chapter 
3 an online measure was used. Furthermore the experiments in Chapter 2 used a hidden box 
paradigm. This meant that the task across prime and target trials was slightly different; in prime 
trials participants had to evaluate two pictures based on a sentence whereas in target trials 
participants were only provided with one picture to evaluate. If they thought that picture did 
not match then they selected the Better Picture option (hidden box). Thus target trials require 
participants to evaluate the picture sentence combination and postulate what a better picture 
could be. In Chapter 3 however there was no Better Picture option thus there was less 
ambiguity in how a participant could respond. One suggestion is that in Chapter 2 participants 
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learned how to respond to the ad hoc trials based on their responses to the some and number 
trials. An interesting way to try and reconcile these different findings would be to explicitly use 
a general purpose alternative (and nothing else) and see whether there is a priming effect. 
Chapter 4 took a novel approach to investigating implicatures by focusing on the speaker. 
Most work on implicatures focuses on how a listener derives an implicature (e.g. Bott & Noveck, 
2004; Breheny, Ferguson, & Katsos, 2013, Geurts, 2010; Sauerland, 2004; Tomlinson, Bailey, & 
Bott, 2013). These are the first experiments to investigate implicatures from a speaker’s 
perspective. We found that interlocutors become aligned in their use of implicatures. That is, the 
production of implicatures can be primed; participants were more likely to produce 
implicatures when their partner was also producing implicatures.  
Participants use of implicatures was affected by speaker consistency; when their partner 
was inconsistent in their use of implicatures participants were less likely to produce 
implicatures. This is consistent with work by Grodner and Sedivy (2011) who found that 
listeners were less likely to derive an implicature when their partner was judged as unreliable. 
We suggested this was a result of audience design (e.g. Brown-Schmidt, Yoon, & Ryskin, 2015; 
Garrod & Doherty, 1994; Horton & Gerrig, 2002; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000). When 
the participant’s partner was inconsistent in their use of implicatures this suggested that they 
may not be able to recognise if they needed to cancel an implicature thus participants were less 
likely to produce implicatures. This suggests that the production of implicatures cannot be 
accounted for entirely through priming. This is similar to the findings from Haywood, Pickering, 
and Branigan (2005). They found that participants could be primed to produce an ambiguous or 
unambiguous syntactic form. However, when the visual context was ambiguous participants 
were more likely to use a disambiguated utterance. This showed that priming effects are 
sensitive to the communicative context. This is further supported by other work finding social 
modulation of alignment and priming (Balcetis & Dale, 2005; Hwang & Chun, 208; 
Weatherholtz, Campbell-Kibler, & Jaeger, 2014). The social modulation of priming effects is 
important to bear in mind, particularly for experiments in pragmatics in which the social 
context the language is used is paramount. 
 Traditionally structural priming has been used to uncover syntactic representations 
however, the findings of this thesis demonstrated that structural priming can also be used to 
provide insights into how pragmatics could be integrated into a representational language 
system.  
Pragmatic theories are traditionally expressed in terms of processes such as domain 
general reasoning procedures whereas structural priming results are explained in terms of 
representations. Thus one explanation for the priming results found in this thesis is that we 
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were priming the processes underpinning pragmatic enrichment. Whilst the findings of 
Chapters 2 and 3 could be explained as priming processes specific to enrichment this could not 
explain the results of Chapter 4. Chapters 2 and 3 found comprehension-comprehension 
priming but Chapter 4 found comprehension-production priming. Implicatures are typically 
described as unidirectional processes from speech to conceptual understanding consequently, 
the processes used in comprehending implicatures would not be the same as those producing 
implicatures. Thus in Chapter 4 we suggested that there are abstract representations that are 
shared between production and comprehension which are responsible for pragmatic priming.  
The representations responsible for pragmatic priming must be different to those 
involved in syntax and semantics. The representations used to generate scalar implicatures 
must take alternatives as part of their input. This is supported by Chapter 2 which showed that 
the alternative primed implicature derivation at the same rate as previously deriving an 
implicature. This does not apply to the representations involved in syntax and semantics. 
Secondly, implicatures are optional thus the implicature representations must also be optional 
(or defeasible). For example, if the speaker is not deemed to have sufficient knowledge to have 
used the stronger term then the implicature representation would have been blocked. The 
results of Chapter 4 lend support to this; when the interlocutor was inconsistent in their use of 
implicatures participants were less likely to align. 
One possibility for the representations involved in pragmatic enrichment is that they are 
sentence level representations,[S ∧  ¬ S′], where S refers to the basic, unenriched sentence, and 
 S′ to the informationally stronger alternative (e.g., all in the case of some). Whether the same 
representations are involved for different categories of enrichment is an open question. It is 
possible that different categories of enrichment have specific representations (such as 
enrichments from quantifiers vs ad hoc enrichments). We have suggested representations 
rather than processes because processes must be directional and it is not clear how the priming 
of processes can account for the findings of Chapter 4 since the priming effect was seen across 
modalities.  
Priming from comprehension to production is traditionally accounted for through the 
existence of shared representations (c.f. Branigan & Pickering, 2017; Branigan, Pickering, & 
Cleland, 2000). Whilst it makes sense to talk about static syntactic representations such as verb 
phrases the same cannot be said for pragmatics. Pragmatic meaning is highly context dependent 
and arises not via static representations but instead through reasoning mechanisms.  It is 
possible that the priming effects seen in this thesis are attributable to bidirectional processes. 
The use of a process in one direction would increase the likelihood of the same process being 
reused at a later stage.  
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Further work is needed for a fuller understanding of what is responsible for the priming 
effect. Whether the priming effect is due to implicature specific representations or pragmatic 
reasoning processes it is still not clear. This thesis however, provides a strong demonstration 
that structural priming can be extended beyond its traditional application to syntax and 
semantics and can be used to provide an insight into many aspects of pragmatic enrichment.
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Appendix 1: Chapter 2 Stimuli 
Experiment 1 
Quantifiers 
Alternative Prime Target 
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Strong prime Target 
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Weak prime Target 
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Numbers 
Alternative prime Target 
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Strong prime Target 
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Weak prime Target 
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Ad Hoc 
Alternative prime Target 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 1 
120 
 
Strong prime Target 
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Weak prime Target 
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Experiment 2 
Weak primes 
Quantifiers Number Ad Hoc 
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Experiment 3 
Targets 
Quantifiers Number Ad Hoc 
   
  Appendix 1 
125 
 
Appendix 1 
126 
 
   
 
  Appendix 2 
127 
 
Appendix 2: Chapter 3 Stimuli 
Experiment 1 
 Primes used in this experiment were the same as those used in the ad hoc conditions of 
Chapter 2. The targets were identical to the primes. See appendix 1 for examples. 
Experiment 2 
Prime Target Referent 
  
Strong prime: The 
microwave 
Weak prime: The washing 
machine 
Target: The snowboarder 
  
Strong prime: The pencil 
Weak prime: The book 
Target: The wallet 
  
Strong prime: The broom 
Weak prime: The sofa 
Target: The baseball bat 
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Strong prime: The hook 
Weak prime: The skull 
Target: The skirt 
  
Strong prime: The 
coathanger  
Weak prime: The 
wardrobe 
Target: The tv 
  
Strong prime: The beaver 
Weak prime: The elephant 
Target: The raspberry 
  
Strong prime: The ant 
Weak prime: The pelican 
Target: The glasses 
  Appendix 2 
129 
 
  
Strong prime: The crown 
Weak prime: The diamond 
Target: The toothbrush 
  
Strong prime: The mouse 
Weak prime: The cat 
Target: The screw 
  
Strong prime: The candy 
cane 
Weak prime: The 
snowman 
Target: The bat 
  
Strong prime: The gecko 
Weak prime: The kangaroo 
Target: The cabbage 
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Strong prime: The starfish 
Weak prime: The whale 
Target: The bone 
  
Strong prime: The moon 
Weak prime: The sun 
Target: The lawnmower 
  
Strong prime: The 
moustache 
Weak prime: The comb 
Target: The jeans 
  
Strong prime: The spatula 
Weak prime: The frying 
pan 
Target: The yoyo 
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Strong prime: The ship 
Weak prime: The 
aeroplane 
Target: The sweet 
  
Strong prime: The penguin 
Weak prime: The flamingo 
Target: The acorn 
  
Strong prime: The tie 
Weak prime: The t-shirt 
Target: The chips 
  
Strong prime: The balloon 
Weak prime: The leaf 
Target: The paintbrush 
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Strong prime: The glass 
Weak prime: The toaster 
Target: The tractor 
  
Strong prime: The bottle 
Weak prime: The dummy 
Target: The egg 
  
Strong prime: The waffles 
Weak prime: The 
aubergine 
Target: The present 
  
Strong prime: The rabbit 
Weak prime: The 
caterpillar 
Target: The hairbrush 
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Strong prime: The guinea 
pig 
Weak prime: The zebra 
Target: The chair 
  
Strong prime: The 
hedgehog 
Weak prime: The cricket 
Target: The basket 
  
Strong prime: The 
helicopter 
Weak prime: The canoe 
Target: The mop 
  
Strong prime: The tomato 
Weak prime: The banana 
Target: The worm 
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Strong prime: The 
megaphone 
Weak prime: The bell 
Target: The submarine 
  
Strong prime: The house 
Weak prime: The fence 
Target: The clock 
  
Strong prime: The mug 
Weak prime: The fork 
Target: The staircase 
  
Strong prime: The fence 
Weak prime: The 
scarecrow 
Target: The hand 
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Strong prime: The flip-
flops 
Weak prime: The scuba 
mask 
Target: The doughnut 
 
Experiment 3 
Prime Target Referent 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The snowboarder 
Alt: The snowboarder and 
the footballer 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The microwave 
Alt: The microwave and 
the washing machine 
Target 
The microwave 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The wallet 
Alt: The wallet and the 
suitcase 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The pencil 
Alt: The pencil and the 
book 
Target 
The pencil 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The baseball bat 
Alt: The baseball bat and 
the kite 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The broom 
Alt: The broom and the 
sofa 
Target 
The broom 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The skirt 
Alt: The skirt and the pin 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The hook 
Alt: The hook and the skull 
Target 
The hook 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The TV 
Alt: The TV and the 
vacuum 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The coat hanger 
Alt: The coat hanger and 
the wardrobe 
Target 
The coat hanger 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The raspberry 
Alt: The raspberry and the 
melon 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The beaver 
Alt: The beaver and the 
elephant 
Target 
The beaver 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The glasses 
Alt: The glasses and the 
horseshoe 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The ant 
Alt: The pelican and the ant 
Target 
The ant 
  Appendix 2 
139 
 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The soap 
Alt: The toothbrush and 
the soap 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The diamond and 
the crown 
Target 
The crown 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The screw 
Alt: The screw and the 
socket 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The mouse 
Alt: The mouse and the cat 
Target 
The mouse 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The bat 
Alt: The bat and the camel 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The candy cane 
Alt: The snowman and the 
candy cane 
Target 
The candy cane 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The cabbage 
Alt: The garlic and the 
cabbage 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The gecko 
Alt: The kangaroo and the 
gecko 
Target 
The gecko 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The bone 
Alt: The bone and the axe 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The starfish 
Alt: The whale and the 
starfish 
Target 
The starfish 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The lawnmower 
Alt: The lawnmower and 
the drill 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The moon 
Alt: The sun and the moon 
Target 
The moon 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The jeans 
Alt: The jeans and the 
dress 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The moustache 
Alt: The comb and the 
moustache 
Target 
The moustache 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The nuts 
Alt: The yoyo and the nuts 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The spatula 
Alt: The frying pan and the 
spatula 
Target 
The spatula 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The sweet 
Alt: The radio and the 
sweet 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The ship 
Alt: The aeroplane and the 
ship 
Target 
The ship 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The acorn 
Alt: The acorn and the 
gorilla 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The t-shirt 
Alt: The t-shirt and the tie 
Target 
The t-shirt 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The chips 
Alt: The chips and 
sandwich 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The flamingo 
Alt: The flamingo and the 
penguin 
Target 
The flamingo 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The paintbrush 
Alt: The paintbrush and 
the stapler 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The leaf 
Alt: The leaf and the 
balloon 
Target 
The leaf 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The tractor 
Alt: The tractor and the 
rake 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The toaster 
Alt: The toaster and the 
glass 
Target 
The toaster 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The egg 
Alt: The egg and the soup 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The dummy 
Alt: The dummy and the 
bottle 
Target 
The dummy 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The present 
Alt: The doll and the 
present 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The aubergine 
Alt: The aubergine and the 
waffles 
Target 
The aubergine 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The hairbrush 
Alt: The hairbrush and the 
bath 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The caterpillar 
Alt: The caterpillar and the 
rabbit 
Target 
The caterpillar 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The chair 
Alt: The chair and the 
sharpener 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The zebra 
Alt: The zebra and the 
guinea pig 
Target 
The zebra 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The basket 
Alt: The basket and the 
ladybird 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The cricket 
Alt: The hedgehog and the 
cricket 
Target 
The cricket 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The mop 
Alt: The mop and the table 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The canoe 
Alt: The helicopter and the 
canoe 
Target 
The canoe 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The worm 
Alt: The squirrel and the 
worm 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The banana 
Alt: The tomato and the 
banana 
Target 
The banana 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The submarine 
Alt: The submarine and 
skateboard 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The bell 
Alt: The megaphone and 
the bell 
Target 
The bell 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The clock 
Alt: The clock and the cup 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The fence 
Alt: The house and the 
fence 
Target 
The fence 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The staircase 
Alt: The staircase and the 
vase 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The fork 
Alt: The cup and the fork 
Target 
The fork 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The hand 
Alt: The hand and the 
helmet 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The scarecrow 
Alt: The feather and the 
scarecrow 
Target 
The scarecrow 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The doughnut 
Alt: The orange and the 
doughnut 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The scuba mask 
Alt: The scuba mask and 
flip-flops 
Target 
The scuba mask 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The lorry 
Alt: The lorry and the 
motorbike 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The hay bale 
Alt: The hay bale and the 
chicken 
Target 
The hay bale 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The fireman 
Alt: The fireman and the 
nurse 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The mitten 
Alt: The mitten and the 
scarf 
Target 
The mitten 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The kite 
Alt: The kite and the darts 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The taco 
Alt: The taco and the 
burger 
Target 
The taco 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The bath 
Alt: The bath and the sink 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The plant pot 
Alt: The plant pot and the 
flower 
Target 
The plant pot 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The nose 
Alt: The nose and the arm 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The parcel 
Alt: The parcel and the 
letter 
Target 
The parcel 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The frog 
Alt: The frog and the swan 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The peg 
Alt: The peg and the iron 
Target 
The peg 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The sprouts 
Alt: The sprouts and the 
milk 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The ice skate 
Alt: The ice skate and the 
hot chocolate 
Target 
The ice skate 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The onion 
Alt: The onion and the 
spade 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The button 
Alt: The button and the 
corn 
Target 
The button 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The pumpkin 
Alt: The pumpkin and the 
chandelier 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The harp 
Alt: The harp and the 
muffin 
Target 
The harp 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The planet 
Alt: The planet and the 
sausages 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The wheelbarrow 
Alt: The wheelbarrow and 
the banjo 
Target 
The wheelbarrow 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The mummy 
Alt: The mummy and the 
scorpion 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The peas 
Alt: The peas and the easel 
Target 
The peas 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The turnip 
Alt: The lemon and the 
turnip 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The sloth 
Alt: The sloth and the net 
Target 
The sloth 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The calculator 
Alt: The key and the 
calculator 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The grapes 
Alt: The grapes and the 
cheese 
Target 
The grapes 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The cactus 
Alt: The shark and the 
cactus 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The gingerbread 
man 
Alt: The gingerbread man 
and the lollipop 
Target 
The gingerbread man 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The bacon 
Alt: The bacon and the 
bread 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The walrus 
Alt: The walrus and the 
peanut 
Target 
The walrus 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The goggles 
Alt: The microscope and 
the goggles 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The giraffe 
Alt: The giraffe and the 
door 
Target 
The giraffe 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The deer 
Alt: The seahorse and the 
deer 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The fairy 
Alt: The fairy and the toad 
Target 
The fairy 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The oven 
Alt: The oven and the 
shaver 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The bowl 
Alt: The bowl and the 
frying pan 
Target 
The bowl 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The plate 
Alt: The plate and the 
handcuffs 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The ice cream 
Alt: The ice cream and the 
pie 
Target 
The ice cream 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The rollerblade 
Alt: The rollerblade and 
the weight 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The sellotape 
Alt: The sellotape and the 
paper clip 
Target 
The sellotape 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The necklace 
Alt: The ring and the 
necklace 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The surfboard 
Alt: The surfboard and the 
book 
Target 
The surfboard 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The sword 
Alt: The sword and the 
princess 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The pram 
Alt: The pram and the 
chain 
Target 
The pram 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The steak 
Alt: The steak and the can 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The compass 
Alt: The compass and the 
skirt 
Target 
The compass 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The lamp 
Alt: The lamp and the 
berries 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The pepper 
Alt: The pepper and the 
rabbit 
Target 
The pepper 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The cherries 
Alt: The cherries and the 
yoghurt 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The stick 
Alt: The umbrella and the 
stick 
Target 
The umbrella 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The CDs 
Alt: The CDs and the 
cassette 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The lobster 
Alt: The jug and the lobster 
Target 
The lobster 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The rocket 
Alt: The rocket and the 
pine cone 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The pancakes 
Alt: The razor and the 
pancakes 
Target 
The pancakes 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The snowflake 
Alt: The snowflake and the 
lightning 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The koala 
Alt: The koala and the 
grapefruit 
Target 
The koala 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The chair 
Alt: The chair and the 
walking stick 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The pocket watch 
Alt: The rower and the 
pocket watch 
Target 
The pocket watch 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The oven glove 
Alt: The funnel and the 
oven glove 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The filing cabinet 
Alt: The chocolate and the 
filing cabinet 
Target 
The filing cabinet 
 
 
No overlap prime 
Weak: The mirror 
Alt: The mirror and the 
needle 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The saw 
Alt: The rolling pin and the 
saw 
Target 
The saw 
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No overlap prime 
Weak: The tent 
Alt: The boot and the tent 
Overlap prime 
Weak: The screwdriver 
Alt: The shoe and the 
screwdriver 
Target 
The screwdriver 
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Appendix 3: Chapter 4 Stimuli 
Experiment 1 
A->A sequence 
Prime Description Target 
 
The microwave 
The cat 
 
 
The cabbage 
The ship 
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The beaver 
The rollerblade 
 
 
The lawnmower 
The chips 
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A->AB sequences 
Prime Description Target 
 
The skirt 
The tomato 
 
 
The broom 
The guinea pig 
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The foot 
The jeans 
 
 
The castle 
The pineapple 
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AB->A sequences 
Prime Description Target 
 
The ladders 
The bathtub 
 
 
The kangaroo 
The plumber 
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The swimming pool 
The box 
 
 
The seahorse 
The house 
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AB->AB sequences 
Prime Description Target 
 
The diamond 
The caterpillar 
 
 
The filing cabinet 
The hockey player 
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The snowman 
The can opener 
 
 
The tennis racket 
The jellyfish 
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Experiment 2 
A->A sequences 
Prime Description Target 
 
The microwave 
The microwave on its 
own 
 
 
The cabbage 
Only the cabbage 
 
 
The ship 
The ship on its own 
 
 
The beaver 
Just the beaver 
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The rollerblade 
Only the rollerblade 
 
 
The lawnmower 
The lawnmower by 
itself 
 
 
The chips 
Just the chips 
 
 
The cat  
The cat by itself 
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A->AB sequences 
Prime Description Target 
 
The skirt 
The skirt on its own 
 
 
The tomato 
The tomato by itself 
 
 
The broom 
The broom by itself 
 
 
The guinea pig 
The guinea pig on its 
own 
 
 
The foot 
Only the foot 
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The jeans 
Only the jeans 
 
 
The castle 
Just the castle 
 
 
The pineapple 
Just the pineapple 
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AB->A sequences 
Prime Description Target 
 
The ladders 
 
 
The kangaroo 
 
 
The plumber 
 
 
The swimming pool 
 
 
The box 
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The bathtub 
 
 
The seahorse 
 
 
The house 
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AB->AB sequences 
Prime Description Target 
 
The diamond 
 
 
The caterpillar 
 
 
The filing cabinet 
 
 
The hockey player 
 
 
The snowman 
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The can opener 
 
 
The tennis racket 
 
 
The jellyfish 
 
 
Experiments 3 & 4 
The stimuli were the same as in Experiment 2. In Experiment 4 half of the A primes were 
presented with a modifier in any one list. This was counterbalanced across so that across 
participants all A card primes were heard with and without a modifier.
 
